Humanism and postmodernism: a reconciliation

Humanist, Jan-Feb, 1993 by Thomas W. Clark

Humanism is often characterized as an alternative to religion in our quest for a good, moral, and self-fulfilling life. Much space in humanist publications is devoted to exposing the internal contradictions of theistic philosophies and their negative social and personal consequences while extolling the virtues of doing without the belief in God, spirit, the afterlife, and other standard religious assumptions. It is the primary tenet of humanism that our lives, in order to be worthwhile, and our society, in order to be humane, need not be grounded in the supernatural; we can be good without God.

While such claims are certainly true and while it is important to reiterate and defend them publicly, humanism is - or should be - subject to the same sort of scrutiny that it brings to bear on its religious antagonists. One of my purposes here is to show that some of the assumptions that have traditionally been used to ground humanism may themselves prove indefensible from the perspective of postmodern philosophy. We might be mistaken to suppose, for instance, that there are such things as an ultimate or universal rationality, a finally true science, or a fixed human nature to which we can tie the humanistic impulse. They are, like notions of a supreme being or a first cause, generated by the belief that our cognitive and ethical dispositions need a foundational justification - a warrant of truth given to them by their correspondence to the way things "really" are. Although I believe that any coherent world view always includes some firmly held notion about "reality," the postmodern, anti-foundationalist turn in philosophy suggests the possibility that such claims are simply a matter of our being compelled, as cognitive creatures, to adopt some general picture of how the world is. In any case, we certainly do not have an objective, perspective-neutral world at hand to which we can compare our views of it.

I would not want such an anti-foundationalist critique to be construed as an attack on core humanist values, since I share and want to protect those values. Rather, it amounts to a defense of humanism against the critique that has been mounted against it by most postmodern philosophers. I want to say that, as humanists, we don't need to invoke reason or science to justify our preferences for a democratic, tolerant, and caring society, within which individuals are free to pursue their private projects. Instead, we are better served by the realization that these preferences are all the foundation we could ever have or need. We then can proceed immediately to the political project of defending and expanding the humanist agenda. I don't think that I am setting up a straw man in contending that secular humanists often resort to rather simplistic appeals to reason, science, and human nature to buttress their case against religion. It's as if, to counter the sectarian rallying cry of "God, country, and the immortal soul!," the humanist feels obliged to retort: "Reason, science, and the individual!" Take, for instance, Alan Dershowitz's recent prescription in Free Inquiry magazine for countering what he warns is "a far more intelligent, far more presentable fundamentalist movement." He says: "We have to prepare for the day when we can't win the debate by laughing at our enemies, when we must out-reason them. . . . We believe that reason will prevail." This exhortation has the same somewhat desperate ring to it as "God is on our side" - and well it should, for it seeks support in an absolute and invincible rationality, before which even the most ardent fundamentalists must humble themselves. If such a rationality existed - one which could pin fundamentalists to the wall by the sheer force of dialectical argument - then it is unlikely that there would be any of them still left to deal with. But Dershowitz's strategy is to ignore the underlying problem of whether or not such a rationality exists and use the name of reason as a rallying cry.

The same sort of examples could be adduced with regard to the scientific method, empirical evidence, and what Tim Madigan has called the "metaphysical primacy of the human person" In humanist manifestos (for example, the back cover of Free Inquiry), these are held to be compelling grounds for claims to establish ethical and social systems. The mention of science, evidence, and the individual occasionally assumes an incantatory role, lulling secularists into the comforting belief that their perspective is somehow endowed with unbiased clarity and universal objectivity. These hallowed terms are deployed rhetorically against the opposing array of religious invocations - but with little effect on those to whom they are anathema.

All this is not to deny that many humanists are aware that the assumptions underlying their agenda are just that: assumptions in need of whatever further justification can be mustered. Nor is it to suggest that humanism lacks the resources - intellectual and otherwise - to go beyond slogans in its quest for popular support. But the tendency nevertheless exists for humanists to think, more than a little complacently, that their beliefs have a secure philosophical footing in rationalism and science, when in fact the situation is rather more tenuous, at least by the standards of contemporary philosophy. What Dewey called the "quest for certainty" colors humanist thought just as surely it does theism and traditional Western philosophy, and defending such an elusive certainty ties up energy better spent on practical issues.