Arguments for philosophical realism in library and information science

Library Trends, Wntr, 2004 by Birger Hjorland

ABSTRACT

THE BASIC: REALIST CLAIM IS THAT A MIND-INDEPENDENT reality exists. It should be common sense knowledge to accept this claim, just as any theories that try to deny it soon become inconsistent because reality strikes back. In spite of this, antirealist philosophies flourish, not only in philosophy but also in the behavioral and cognitive sciences and in information science. This is highly problematic because it removes the attention from reality to subjective phenomena with no real explanatory power. Realism should not be confused with the view that all scientific claims are true or with any other kind of naivete concerning knowledge claims. The opposite of realism may be termed antirealism, idealism, or nonlinalism. Although many people confuse empiricism and positivism with realism, these traditions are by nature strongly antirealist, which is why a sharp distinction should be made between empiricism and realism. Empirical research should not be founded on assumptions about "the given" of observations, but should recognize the theory-laden nature of observations. Domain analysis represents an attempt to reintroduce a realist perspective in library and information science. A realist conception of relevance, information seeking, information retrieval, and knowledge organization is outlined. Information systems of all kinds, including research libraries and public libraries, should be informed by a realist philosophy and a realist information science.

INTRODUCTION

Several forms of philosophical realism exist, including scholastic realism, transcendental realism, scientific realism, critical realism, and naive realism. The author of this paper subscribes to a view that may be termed "pragmatic realism." This paper does not, however, contain a detailed philosophical defense for this view. It is a preliminary work aiming at contributing some important problems in information science, which to the author seem deeply related to philosophical problems, in general, and to problems related to realism, in particular.

The basic claim of realism is that a mind-independent reality exists: for examples the mountains existed before mankind, and they exist independently of whether or not people believe they exist or whether or what they think about them. This is a claim about what exists. Technically speaking this is an ontological or metaphysical claim, and the philosophical position is termed "metaphysical realism." (1) It is shocking that one has to argue for the existence of a mind-independent reality. It is even more shocking that antirealism seems to dominate the discourse today and that not many philosophers or scientists are defending realism in a really scholarly way. It is also shocking that antirealism seems to have brought about much confusion in information science, among other fields. Richard Boyd (2002) writes:

   What requires explanation is why this [scientific realism] is a
   philosophical position rather than just a common sense one.
   Consider, for example, tropical fish realism--the doctrine that
   there really are tropical fish; that the little books you buy about
   them at pet stores tend to get it approximately right about their
   appearance, behavior, food and temperature requirements, etc.; and
   that the fish have these properties largely independently of our
   theories about them. That's a pretty clear doctrine, but it's so
   commonsensical that it doesn't seem to have any particular
   philosophical import. Why is the analogous doctrine about science a
   philosophical doctrine? [Electronic version]

Yes, it is indeed difficult to see why philosophical realism is not common sense and thus the only legitimate philosophical position. However, I do not understand (accept) Boyd's tropical fish example. As a realist, I agree that tropical fish exist. (2) To consider this example, we have to look at the philosophical positions that confront the realist ones.

The opposite of realism is today often termed "antirealism" (coined so by Michael Dummett) ; in older philosophy the opposite was often termed "idealism," while Charles Sanders Peirce argued that realism is the opposite of nominalism. In the Marxist and materialist traditions, the opposing positions are termed "materialism" and "idealism," respectively. Although important differences exist, these oppositions are closely related. They are all related to the same fundamental claim: The possibility of the existence of a mind-independent reality. So, the realist/materialist position is that tropical fish exist, while the antirealist/idealist/nominalist position would say that they only exist as ideas, concepts, social constructions or the like, not as mind-independent entities.

The difficulty in understanding the realist position is, in my opinion, much worse than Boyd describes it. It is not limited to the understanding of scientific knowledge but is deeply involved with our everyday knowledge. Yes, it is really shocking that well-informed, serious, and hard-working people end up denying what seems to be the most obvious and fundamental lesson of human knowledge. Often this denial is not explicit but implied by other theoretical views. (3) It is a real philosophical ocean to swim in, but I do hope that this paper will demonstrate that we have no choice. The problem simply is too important for the development of our field.