Arguments for philosophical realism in library and information science

Library Trends, Wntr, 2004 by Birger Hjorland

While empiricism represents an attempt to remove metaphysical and ideological questions from science by sticking strictly to observations, critics have pointed out that pure observation does not exist, that our observations are theory-laden. The American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) maintained that classical empiricism is a myth based on the "doctrine of the given" (c.f. Vinci, 1999, p. 828). By not considering metaphysical, theoretical, and ideological questions openly, empiricism tends to hide the ideological commitments of its adherents. It has been demonstrated that empiricism does imply a metaphysical view. This way empiricism becomes just one ideology among others. Its belief in sensory information as "the given" is a faulty assumption. The deep and consequent claim of this mistaken assumption has brought empiricism into a strong antirealist position. Empiricism is a problematic philosophy, but this does not, of course, imply that empirical research is mistaken. It may imply, however, that empirical research should be based on a realist philosophy.

Many (post)modern epistemologists do not find that science should aim at objectivity. There is a tendency to associate positivist positions and ideals with attributes such as "hard" and "objective," whereas ideals from the humanities and hermeneutics are associated with "softness" and "subjectivity." This is a wrong and harmful confusion. First, it is important to realize that subjectivity is not the logical opposite of objectivity:

   We shall not dwell at such length on the notion of subjectivity,
   insofar as it refers to the opinions, beliefs, and feelings of
   conviction of this or that individual. Let us mainly note that this
   is not in any way the logical opposite of objectivity. People said
   to be "reasonable" or "sensible" will often give their (subjective)
   agreement to a well-corroborated (objective) statement such as "when
   an apple becomes detached from a tree, it falls down and does not
   fly towards the stars." In that sense, obviously, any probabilistic
   statement, insofar as some individual expresses his support for it,
   can always be said to be subjective. But this does not exclude a
   priori its objectivity. An objective law, such as the law of
   universal attraction, insofar as I believe it to be "true" can also
   be said to be subjective, since it does, in tact, represent my
   personal opinion. (Matheron, 1989/1978, pp. 26-27)

Second, objectivity should be an ideal for all epistemologies. Best (1998) concludes his review of Harding (1998) as follows: "As Harding ably shows, the politicization and pluralization of knowledge is not necessarily a threat to (strong) objectivity, but one of its preconditions." This quotation is important. It says that what are often regarded as soft, subjective methods are in reality a precondition for "strong objectivity." Harding seeks to replace the "weak objectivity" of the male-dominated scientific world--a pseudo-objectivity riddled with value-laden theories, political biases, domineering interests, commodified research, and blinkered ethical vision--with the "strong objectivity" that comes only from a "robust reflexivity" attained through a rigorous self-scrutiny of one's socioepistemological starting point. Harding notes that the very concept of "value-free knowledge" is oxymoronic since the goal of being disinterested is an interest in itself, and it allows science to separate fact from value and abrogate responsibility for its actions. Since "value-free" theories are impossible, Harding argues, one might as well acknowledge the values that inform one's research--be it to make money or to improve the lives of the sick--debate their comparative validity, and struggle to have science informed by progressive interests.