Afterword LIS as applied philosophy of information: a reappraisal

Library Trends, Wntr, 2004 by Luciano Floridi

LIBRARY INFORMATION SCIENCE (LIS) should develop its foundation in terms of a philosophy of information (PI). This seems a rather harmless suggestion. Where else could information science look for its conceptual foundations if not in PI? However, accepting this proposal means moving away from one of the few solid alternatives currently available in the field, namely, providing LIS with a foundation in terms of social epistemology (SE). This is no trivial move, so some reasonable reluctance is to be expected. To overcome it, the proposal needs to be more than just acceptable; it must be convincing. In Floridi (2002a), I have articulated some of the reasons why I believe that PI can fulfill the foundationalist needs better than SE can. I won't rehearse them here. I find them compelling, but I am ready to change my mind if counterarguments become available. Rather, in this contribution, I wish to clarify some aspects of my proposal (Floridi, 2002a) in favor of the interpretation of LIS as applied PI. I won't try to show you that I am right in suggesting that PI may provide a foundation for LIS better than SE. My more modest goal is to remove some ambiguities and possible misunderstandings that might prevent the correct evaluation of my position, so that disagreement can become more constructive.

We often hear about the differences between the ordinary librarian, busily involved in managing and delivering a public service, and the information scientist or the LIS expert, deep in theoretical speculations. The line of reasoning here seems that a foundation for LIS should satisfy both and that this is something that PI cannot achieve, hence the objection that PI is not "social" enough. I accept the inference, but I disagree on the premise. For I think we should distinguish as clearly and neatly as possible between three main layers.

There is a first layer where we deal with libraries, their contents and services. Compare this with the accountant's calculations and financial procedures. One may wish to develop a theory of everyday mathematics and its social practices--surely this would be a worthy and interesting study--but it seems impossible to confuse it with the study of mathematics as a formal science. The latter is a second layer. It is what LIS amounts to, what one learns, with different degrees of complexity, through the university curriculum that educates a librarian or an information specialist. There is then a third layer, in which only a minority of people is interested. We call it foundational. For mathematics, it is the philosophy of mathematics. I suggested PI for LIS. My point here is that it is important to acknowledge and respect the distinction between these three layers; otherwise one may criticize x for not delivering y when x is not there to deliver y in the first place. When checking whether the bank charged you too much for an overdraft, you are not expected to provide an analysis of the arithmetic involved in terms of Peano's axioms. Likewise, a scientist may be happy with a clear understanding of statistics without ever wishing to enter into the philosophical debate on the foundations of probability theory. So I do not see why LIS cannot be provided with an equally theoretical approach, capable of addressing issues that the ordinary practitioner and the expert would deem too abstract to deserve attention in everyday practices (mind that I'm talking about layers not people; one can wear different bats in different contexts; this is not the issue here). In the end, I agree that PI should seek to explain a very wide range of phenomena and practices. I would add that this is precisely the challenge ahead. The scope of PI spans a whole variety of practices, precisely because the aim of PI is foundationalist.

If we assume for a moment that LIS is applied PI, and that PI can provide LIS with a conceptual foundation, the next question concerns how, more specifically, PI and LIS may interact. This special issue provides plenty of evidence of the sort of fruitful investigations prompted by a PI approach to LIS. Three more examples may further illustrate the point and shed some more light on the SE vs. PI debate. A PI approach to the foundations of LIS may be expected to work on the ontology of its (i.e., LIS's) "objects," on a substantial theory of information dynamics, and on an ethical approach to the domain of information. I shall say a bit more on each topic in the following pages, but let me stress here that if you find these areas of inquiry important, you also may want to concede that they fall beyond the scope of any SE approach. Let us now return to PI itself.

A simple way of introducing PI is by referring to it as the philosophical discipline that attempts to answer the question "What is information?" I understand that the question itself can be tiresome, at least because there is no simple way of answering it, despite its misleading simplicity. Ordinary moves, like checking the dictionary, consulting an encyclopaedia, compiling a survey, or piling up quotations, won't do, and not just because we are the ones who write those sources and entries anyway. Imagine trying to answer questions like "What is life?" "What is the mind?" or "What is meaning?" in the same way. Questions such as these are ways of opening a dialogue and launching investigations that may keep generations of scholars and scientists busy. They are like road signs indicating the direction in which we should move. Complaining about the lack of precise answers is pointless. Philosophical questions are inevitably open-ended. We have to leave them behind to step ahead.