Q: Would it be a mistake to let the United Nations play the lead role in reconstructing Iraq? No: The U.S. will have far more to gain than lose by collaborating with the U.N. in Iraq's renewal

0 Comments | Insight on the News, May 27, 2003

Byline: David J. Scheffer, SPECIAL TO INSIGHT

Rebuilding Iraq in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom presents a broad range of challenges to the United States and the international community. How they will be met in the coming months and years will deeply influence the future of U.S. foreign policy and the fate of the United Nations. Any strategy that seeks unduly to constrain the United States as the primary occupying power in Iraq would be unrealistic. Likewise, any strategy that excludes the United Nations from all but subordinated humanitarian tasks needlessly would generate confrontation with other nations and within Iraqi society, create legal uncertainties for the emerging Iraqi government and burden the United States with responsibilities and costs that its taxpayers soon may regret.

Prior to the U.S.-led military intervention into Iraq in March, several major professional studies of the looming aftermath of such an intervention pointed to the urgent need to plan for the disarmament of Iraq, the management of its oil resources, the rapid deployment of a sufficient number of civilian police to maintain law and order in the streets, the restoration of a credible judicial system (including the prosecution of war criminals), the rebuilding of Iraq's infrastructure, the reform and revival of a sound educational system, the provision of humanitarian assistance and the creation of a new democratic government. Each of these studies guided by lessons learned from prior postconflict efforts pointed to the critical role of the United Nations.

Most other governments including the United States' closest ally in the Iraqi venture, the United Kingdom have argued strongly for a substantial U.N. role and continue to press for it. Indeed, President George W. Bush, with British Prime Minister Tony Blair at his side, pledged on April 8 that the United Nations will have a "vital'' role to play in postconflict Iraq.

Now that the aftermath has arrived, it seems all of the foresight demonstrated in those studies, all of the views expressed by our staunchest allies and even the public commitment of President Bush are of little consequence to those seeking both U.S. dominance of postwar Iraq and the sidelining of the United Nations. A juggernaut of U.S. military forces and civilian administrators, seemingly oblivious to the intensive debate within the international community and even among Iraqis desiring some U.N. engagement, has taken control of Iraq.

There is an intoxicating simplicity to the enterprise as it involves only two parties: the powerful United States and the newly liberated, ethnically diverse Iraq. Meanwhile, a xenophobic (notably anti-French) attitude and a U.N.-phobic mind-set have seized all manner of U.S. policymaking and commentary. The political and legal complexities (plus advantages) of the United Nations' role in the entire matter are cast overboard with little consideration of the consequences.

If the United States continues to assume almost the entire responsibility for the renewal of Iraq to the exclusion of the United Nations, and if it is prepared to shoulder the enormous manpower requirements, multibillion-dollar financial burdens and political turmoil such an undertaking will entail for the foreseeable future, then the rest of the international community may find it easier simply to acquiesce in Washington's go-it-alone gamble in Iraq. U.S. appeals for donor support (including from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) would fall far short of their targets, few nations would risk granting legal legitimacy to U.S. actions and, if security or interethnic relations within Iraq deteriorate, the United States and its few coalition partners would be left on their own to sort out the mess. Iran, Turkey and Syria will be waiting to seize any tactical advantage they can; when they do, the United States could find itself cornered.

Few governments will be persuaded (but most will be provoked) by simplistic declarations from Washington that herald the demise of the United Nations and the end of its equities (other than humanitarian) in Iraq, or that the "coalition of the willing" are the only nations to participate in post-Saddam Iraq, or that international tribunals have no possible role to play in Iraqi justice, or that the interim government organized under U.S. auspices will be legitimate and sovereign simply because Washington says it is, or that existing oil and other financial contracts can be disposed of readily by the Iraqis themselves. The world happens to be more complicated than such musings infer, and the United States will have to try harder if it hopes to freeze out the United Nations and most of the international community.

The U.N. Security Council of which the United States is a key permanent member has a relatively long history of engagement in Iraq under the U.N. Charter's Chapter VII enforcement authority. Years of U.S.-inspired Security Council resolutions mandating economic sanctions, weapons inspections and disarmament and the oil-for-food program cannot be nullified simply because the world's most powerful nation has forced the collapse of the Iraqi regime and militarily occupied Iraq. If such regime change and occupation had occurred following the explicit authorization of the Security Council to undertake Operation Iraqi Freedom, then at least one might infer the intent of the council to transform its authorities over Iraq. But in this case that explicit Security Council authorization was not forthcoming, and therefore one cannot assume any abdication by the council of its equities in Iraq.