Q: Does the crisis in Liberia warrant putting more than a few troops in harm's way? YES: Putting some boots on the ground now will save lives and stabilize the region

0 Comments | Insight on the News, Sept 2, 2003

Byline: James L. Woods, SPECIAL TO INSIGHT

What should be the role of U.S. forces in Liberia? How many of them should be posted ashore? Should any of them be ordered into combat operations? And what is the U.S. national interest in this affair? Why should we be involved at all in this hellhole in West Africa?

For me, these issues bear a special poignancy, taking me back 13 years to 1990, when another U.S. task force was sitting off Liberia and we were arguing most of these same issues in the National Security Council (NSC) "Deputies Committee" at the White House. But then the situation was spiraling down and down, going out of control, and the issue was whether the United States should intervene to stop it. Was there a "special relationship" between the United States and Liberia because of the historical ties going back to the 1820s, when Liberia was founded by freed American slaves? If so, did this create a special responsibility on the part of the United States to intervene to stop the carnage and head off the impending collapse of the country? Did we "owe" Liberia any special consideration because of its steadfast support throughout the years of the Cold War the diplomatic and Voice of America and intelligence-communications sites that we had there, our heavy use of Roberts Field for official supply flights to all parts of Africa, or for use of the OMEGA navigation facility?

The debate at NSC was long and hot, but in the end the decision was not to intervene and to limit the use of our Marines to evacuating the U.S. and other embassies in Monrovia.

The arguments of we "Africanists" were rejected by the high policymakers of the day. "There is no special relationship, except perhaps in the minds of the Liberians; there is no special responsibility; the Cold War is over; time for Africans to start solving their own problems, etc." So for months the Marine task force only sailed up and down the Liberian coast, and then finally sailed away, leaving the country to self-destruction, which followed surely and on a most appalling scale. Monrovia was trashed, tens of thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands uprooted and displaced, and the basic economy of the country ground to a halt except for those activities that could line the pockets of the rapacious warlords, both inside and outside the government.

The conflict then went on to Liberia's neighbors, first Sierra Leone, then Guinea and Ivory Coast, threatening to destabilize and pauperize the entire region. It was not America's proudest moment, but no one has ever felt the need to apologize.

Now, 13 years later, we stand at a similar crossroads, and there are many good reasons this time for taking a bolder approach. Yes, put some boots on the ground; if required put the troops in harm's way, and try this time to be a positive force for a better outcome for Liberia, for troubled West Africa and for ourselves.

The military aspects of doing this in Liberia are not formidable. This is not Somalia. Most of the Liberian people will welcome our presence. The armed factions are mainly rabble, many of them children, very poorly trained and only lightly armed. Most of them are war-weary and ready to stand down. Some are not, and deadly force may have to be used, and yes, there might be casualties. But breaking the back of any group that resists the intervention or refuses to stop fighting should not be difficult and should be aggressively pursued. I repeat: aggressively pursued.

The military phase likely would be neither long nor expensive. This is not Afghanistan or Iraq. We are not talking about years and billions of dollars; we are talking a few months, and probably several hundred millions of dollars. Yes, U.S. forces around the world are overstretched and overcommitted, and trouble with North Korea could be brewing. But a small number of our troops can handle Liberia and then get back to their main agenda in short order.

This is a splendid opportunity to follow through on the rhetoric of the last decade: helping Africans address their own security problems. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force of more than 3,000 troops from many African nations will bear most of the burdens of fighting if need be and of policing the transitional occupation. The U.S. role would be in support, including (I fervently hope) violent and decisive combat support, if needed. With our strong support, the ECOWAS mission can succeed; without it, a positive outcome is very uncertain indeed.

This also is an opportunity to revive a long-standing cooperative working relationship with the European powers in Africa, especially the British (whose forces already have taken on a similar burden in neighboring Sierra Leone) and French (yes, France, which has some 4,000 troops now trying to restore and maintain peace in Ivory Coast). Liberia alone in Africa is uniquely an American responsibility, but in coming to its aid we would be working in concert with the African states concerned and with our European allies to bring peace and stability to the entire West African region.