Fumbled Olive Branches From Milosevic

0 Comments | Insight on the News, May 31, 1999 | by Jamie Dettmer

Was Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic prepared to accept a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis the same weekend he handed over three U.S. prisoners of war to civil-rights leader Jesse Jackson? Did the Clinton administration fail to grab an olive branch waved by the Serbs? The 10 members of a bipartisan congressional delegation that was ordered by administration officials not to travel to Belgrade on May 1 certainly believe so. They accuse the White House of missing a golden opportunity for peace and of needlessly prolonging the war in the Balkans all because of hesitation or muddled thinking.

News alert! has learned that on May 1 Milosevic signaled to U.S. and Russian lawmakers meeting in nearby Vienna his readiness to sign a framework-for-peace document they had agreed on after hours of diligent negotiation. That document, which would see an international peacekeeping force allowed by Milosevic into Kosovo, formed the basis for a diplomatic solution to the Balkans crisis that was agreed to by Western foreign ministers, including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, several days later in Bonn. Members of the bipartisan delegation, led by GOP Rep. Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, are asking themselves why they weren't allowed to get Milosevic's signature to it when the chance was there.

According to Weldon and several members of his delegation, they were informed during the Vienna meeting with a team of Russian parliamentarians that Milosevic was ready to hand over the American captives and sign their framework document. The delegation was told that Milosevic was unlikely to give the American captives up to Jackson -- partly, some of them were told, because the Serb leader didn't want to "reward an African-American."

With trusted Milosevic advisers telling them of the good chances of securing the release of the Americans and of getting a diplomatic solution going, Weldon spoke by phone with Undersecretary of State Tom Pickering and asked him to give the go-ahead for the delegation to travel to Belgrade that day.

"I read to him the framework document we had agreed with the Russians," says Weldon. "Pickering agreed that Jesse's mission was heading for failure and that he wouldn't get the [prisoners of war] out. But he said Milosevic was not to be trusted and we shouldn't go to Belgrade even if that meant we could get the Americans released." Pickering asked Weldon why he thought Milosevic could be trusted. Weldon responded: "All I can tell you is that the Russians say this is for real." Picketing wasn't convinced and wouldn't budge.

Democratic Rep. Maurice Hinchey of New York also sought to obtain administration approval for the delegation to head for Belgrade. He spoke by phone with presidential aide John Podesta, who likewise poured scorn on the idea that Milosevic would agree to their framework document.

"We should have been allowed to go," says Weldon. "The issue was not the POWs. We could have had Milosevic's embrace of a framework that the foreign ministers have basically agreed to. I hope we have not lost the opportunity. In the end someone is going to have to sit down face to face with Milosevic and negotiate or call his bluff, if that's what it is. It obviously can't be the president, but someone has to and we had the chance."