Panel Chairman Warns of Nuclear Neglect

0 Comments | Insight on the News, July 23, 2001 | by Sean Paige

In 1999, following allegations of nuclear espionage and slipshod security at Department of Energy research labs, Congress created a new office, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), with a mandate to set things right in the nation's enervated nuclear-weapons program. The Clinton administration grudgingly acceded to the idea, at least rhetorically, because the political heat was on. But two years later the new agency itself is mired in serious management problems, the chairman of an oversight panel recently told Congress, raising serious questions about whether NNSA is in any way an improvement.

John S. Foster, chairman of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, recently warned the House Armed Services Committee that a "disconnect" was occurring between the declared U.S. policy of maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear-weapons program and the deteriorating condition of our nuclear facilities and infrastructure. "National leaders -- civilian and military, executive and legislative -- have stated repeatedly that sustaining a safe and reliable stockpile ... is a supreme national interest" Foster said. "It is our view that the programs for sustaining the stockpile are not being managed in a manner commensurate with their importance."

Foster testified that even a smaller nuclear force required modernization and upkeep. He suggested that the government thus far has failed to develop the new "tools" necessary to ensure the arsenal's safety and reliability into the future, with or without underground nuclear testing.

NNSA faces a number of major technical challenges in maintaining an aging arsenal, according to Foster. Foremost among them is that the U.S. nuclear-weapons complex is falling into disrepair and cannot keep up with maintenance and modernization schedules on nuclear weapons. Foster cited "worrisome signs of deterioration" in the nuclear stockpile. These signs include an inability by the United States to produce plutonium triggers for nuclear warheads and the failure to establish "an integrated capability for design, production and certification of warheads," as dictated by the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review.

Within NNSA itself, Foster said, roles and responsibilities need to be more clearly defined while decision-making is streamlined and simplified.