Nuclear security in state of unreadiness

0 Comments | Insight on the News, Oct 1, 2002 | by Martin Edwin Andersen

Underequipped, undermanned and underpaid, security guards at three of four nuclear reactors surveyed by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), a nonprofit public-interest group, say that they lack confidence in the ability of their own forces to repel a terrorist attack. Low morale frequently was cited as a serious problem by the more than 20 security guards interviewed who protect 24 nuclear reactors at 13 plants.

More than one-half of the guards interviewed told POGO that post-Sept. 11 requirements by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that protective-force numbers be increased to more than the five to 10 security guards formerly required to be on duty at each nuclear reactor have met with a tepid industry response. Rather than hiring additional guards, plants merely have increased the overtime of the existing guard force--as many as six consecutive days of 12-hour shills--causing serious concerns about on-the-job fatigue. Although a few plants have increased actual numbers of security personnel, with one tripling its guard force, most interviewed said that their numbers and training still were below the levels necessary to defeat a real terrorist attack. POGO cited one guard as saying: "If an attack took place, most of the guards would run like hell."

Failure to receive adequate training was another key complaint. The report noted that nuclear-industry executives claim that security guards receive 270 hours of predeployment training, 90 hours each year to recertify their weapons readiness and 30 hours annually in antiterrorism tactical exercises. "None of these claims appear to be true" POGO reported. "Most guards interviewed train with their weapons only once per year during their annual weapons qualification for two to three hours. Most also have had no training or practice in shooting at a moving target. `Tabletop' exercises are so rudimentary that utilities use red-and-blue-colored clothespins to depict locations and tactics of guards and terrorists."

Other findings by POGO include guards' concerns that they are not equipped with adequate weaponry and would be unable to match the firepower terrorists are known to use. Legislation currently before the Senate--the Nuclear Security Act of 2002--would fix part of the problem, which is compounded by restrictive state laws.

Turnover in the guard force at some plants is as high as 70 to 100 percent during the 3.5-year life of a labor contract, in part due to low wages and benefits. At six nuclear facilities, security guards received $1 to $4 less per hour than janitors.

The lack of guidance on the use of deadly force also was reported to be a major problem. "Guards are currently restricted from using deadly force unless an intruder is wielding a weapon or threatening the life of an individual" the report noted. "If a suicidal terrorist with a backpack (possibly containing explosives) jumped the fence and headed straight for a spent-fuel pool or reactor, the guard could only observe and report the event. One guard summed up the problem stating, `If you pull the trigger, you're on your own, and you'll need a good lawyer.'"

POGO Executive Director Danielle Brian tells INSIGHT that the NRC failed to respond adequately to possible security threats at the power plants in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. For example, NRC guidelines requiring utilities only to hold off attackers until outside law-enforcement personnel arrive are grossly inadequate, she says. Tabletop exercises initiated in July by the NRC show response time of one to two hours for outside SWAT teams, even though NRC performance tests indicate terrorists need only three to 10 minutes to achieve their goal.