Symposium

0 Comments | Insight on the News, April 1, 2003 | by Abdulwahab Alkebsi, | Robert Spencer

* justice as the paramount criterion in human relations, whether it is between the ruler and the ruled, the Muslim and the non-Muslim, or men and women;

* pluralism and tolerance accepted and practiced in the political, social and religious spheres.

Despite many encouraging signs, for President Bush's vision for the Middle East to take hold, and for the United States to be a positive influence in reducing the "freedom gap," this administration has to overcome an enormous credibility gap. The Arab world--and the Muslim world for that matter--does not believe that the United States is sincere about democratic reforms in their countries or in the region.

Most Arabs believe that the United States is using democracy as a pretext for achieving narrow, shortsighted U.S. interests and for stable, low, oil prices. They fault the United States for not speaking out on behalf of democracy when the culprits of tyranny are U.S. allies, but become vociferous advocates of democracy when the culprits are foes. Bush said, "America's interest in security and America's belief in liberty both lead in the same direction." Unless these words are translated into actions in Iraq and elsewhere, the United States will fail to effect positive change in the region and will gain more enemies because of its actions in Iraq.

Bush and his policy team face two major dilemmas. How they tackle these dilemmas will define U.S.-Islamic relations for decades to come.

First, in Iraq, the United States needs quick results to demonstrate to a skeptical and impatient Arab and Muslim world that U.S. intervention not only will rid the world of the menace of weapons of mass destruction, but also will lead to freedom and prosperity for the Iraqi people. What support and welcome American GI's will find in Baghdad will disappear rapidly unless Iraqis see tangible political and economic results. These pressures might cause the United States to accept a quick fix. But the fact is, democracy takes time, and Iraqis will need to make democracy a way of life and an integral part of the national education and culture. Therefore, U.S. plans for a post-Saddam Iraq should include tangible landmarks and incremental steps, but should have the stamina for a long and difficult democratization process. Additionally, the other countries and regimes should not feel threatened by changes in Iraq but should be recruited as partners toward positive change.

Second, the United States wants democracy for Iraq and the region. However, a likely outcome of free and fair elections is a victory for Islamists or secularists who, at least in the short run, might not be friendly to the United States. Is the administration willing to accept the free will of the people? This is a crucial point that has to be clearly articulated and applied in any U.S. policy toward Iraq and the region. Overturning the results of a free election because the outcome is not seen as "positive" by the United States will cause enmity toward the United States and will come back to haunt it down the road. History is replete with examples of U.S. missteps in such experiments. Some claim, for example, that the Iranian hatred toward the United States in 1979 was a direct result of the U.S.-led coup against Mussadeq in the 1950s and subsequent support of the shah.