Nuclear inspections approach could explode in our faces - concern over International Atomic Energy Agency's military weapon policy for Iraq - Column

0 Comments | Insight on the News, March 15, 1993 | by Stephen Bryen

During the 1980s, the International Atomic Energy Agency inspected Iraq's nuclear program. The agency gave Iraq a clean bill of health, even though Iraq was carrying out a massive armaments campaign and had already had one nuclear reactor bombed by Israel because Israel feared that Iraq was on the verge of producing enriched uranium, and even though ever more public information was available about Iraq's acquisition of nuclear hardware and know-how. It may be happening again, despite all the hoopla about tough inspections.

The agency's finding was significant because it enabled Western governments to continue to sell Iraq technology that had potential use in the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons. Licensing officials could, when challenged by national security experts, point to the atomic agency's findings as proof that controversial exports were "safe."

This result was far from trivial. The nuclear know-how from Germany, Britain, the United States, the Netherlands and elsewhere brought Iraq's weapons program close to completion. Had Saddam Hussein shown patience and not misread U.S. intentions, he would have stayed out of Kuwait until Iraq developed a bomb. If he had, would America have come on a white horse to restore the Kuwait monarchy?

While it may seem that this is history as it might have been, I have a sense of deja vu about the atomic energy agency, because now it may be positioning Saddam to finally get his bomb and change history again. I am particularly concerned that the agency is allowing Iraq to keep sophisticated equipment useful for making nuclear weapons.

Information about this is not a secret. The U.S. decision to bomb a factory at Zaafaraniyeh in the last days of the Bush administration was no accident. The target was selected precisely because it is of great significance to Iraq's nuclear program. After the Persian Gulf war, it was "cleared" by the atomic agency and allowed to operate, despite its significance.

There are two major facilities at Zaafaraniyeh. One, an electronics plant called Digila, has been inspected by the agency. The other, even more important, was Al Rabiya, destroyed in U.S.-led bombings in January. Like most other Iraqi manufacturing centers, Al Rabiya produced goods for the civilian economy and for the military. It was run by the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, which directs Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The ministry was at the center of the acquisition of nuclear weapons technology from the West.

Al Rabiya's specialty was high-precision machining. It was full of state-of-the-art machine tools from Europe, including large German machine tools from Maho, SHW, Dorries and Hauser. The factory was capable of machining complex castings, some of which went into the manufacture of calutrons. Calutrons are one means of extracting highly enriched uranium for making nuclear weapons. Other machinery at Al Rabiya was suited for manufacturing components for centrifuges. It is known that Iraq had an ambitious centrifuge program and that Al Rabiya played an important role in it.

According to the atomic energy agency, Al Rabiya contained 78 machines that the agency determined had a known, nuclear end use. Throughout Iraq, the agency identified 603 machines with such capability. In other words, Al Rabiya contained 12 percent of the machinery for Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

When the atomic energy agency inspected Al Rabiya after the Gulf war, it was fully intact. The agency decided not to seek its dismantlement or the destruction of its machines. No seals were placed on the machinery.

Why? It seems that the agency reached a decision - never revealed to the public - not to destroy Iraq's industrial capability, even if it was suited for nuclear weapons manufacture. In an interview, David Kyd, an agency spokesman, said Al Rabiya was "in the second rank" and "absolutely out of action." How was it possible that a site which had been fully operational, containing, advanced tools found by the agency to be useful in making nuclear weapons, was "out of action"?

One explanation - but it is purely speculation - is that the atomic energy agency does not see control of "dual use" machinery as part of its mission. The explanation is supported by the fact that the agency's focus is heavily on machinery specifically designed for manufacturing nuclear weapons. In most Western countries, this kind of equipment is strictly controlled under munitions laws. Dual use machinery and technology are much more loosely controlled.

Unfortunately, in today's world, dual use equipment can be very dangerous in the wrong hands. Iraq's military-industrial infrastructure is primarily composed of dual use equipment that can make everything from chemical and nuclear weapons to long-range missiles. If the International Atomic Energy Agency chooses not to understand this, the impact of the U.N. inspect-and-destroy program is going to be far less than we have been led to believe. Saddam will preserve primary assets to rebuild his war-making capability.