Q: Will stricter sanctions against Cuba bring down the Castro regime?

0 Comments | Insight on the News, April 22, 1996 | by Dan Burton, | Roger W. Fontaine

This has two chances of working: slim and none. The sad fact is that the United States has tried this -- and failed miserably. The first attempt at such a tutorial role was enshrined in the Platt Amendment, which was in effect from 1902 until its repeal 32 years later.

The amendment's core forbade Cuban governments from making any agreement with a third nation that would compromise Havana's independence. Nor could Cuba grant any other nation special rights or privileges without Washington's approval. The Platt Amendment also prohibited Cuba from obtaining loans without sufficient collateral and, most intrusive, gave the United States the right to intervene if the American government believed Cuban independence or stability were in danger or if property rights and individual liberty were threatened.

The spirit of Platt lives on in Helms-Burton. This is not a trifling historical point. The Platt Amendment was deeply resented by politically active Cubans -- in fact, it poisoned American-Cuban relations for two generations and created the kind of anti-American resentment that Castro so successfully exploited -- and still exploits for his own purposes.

Worse, neoplattismo will undercut future Cuban leaders. Whether it has been Spanish, American or Russian, an outside patron always has been resented and has helped foster a nationalist spirit in Cuba that is as febrile and volatile as any in the world.

No matter what a post-Castro government would do under Helms-Burton, it would be seen in Cuba as acting on orders from the Americans, compromising Cuba's long-sought independence. Thus handicapped, any government would become the target of every demagogue and patriot on the island -- hardly the atmosphere for a nascent democracy to thrive.

So, what is to be done? Lenin at least asked the right question. In this case, since the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act is the law of the land, the answer is very little -- at least for the short term. The president, for example, no longer is free to lift the embargo unilaterally -- which would put the onus of Castro's failures squarely on him -- because all previous Cuban-related executive orders now are embedded in the legislation.

The law also brews fresh troubles. For example, former owners who lost property in Cuba can sue in federal court foreign corporations acquiring that property. Furthermore, the State Department is instructed to deny entry visas to senior executives of those corporations. Under a compromise worked out with the White House, however, the president retains the power to delay implementation of this provision in renewable six-month intervals, an option President Clinton, at least, is likely to exercise.

The idea behind all this tough stuff is to discourage third-country investment in Cuba, thus denying the Castro government the resources to survive. That's doubtful, but one thing is certain: If enforced, relations with our European and Canadian allies will be strained seriously.

At the moment, direct foreign investment is not, in fact, flooding into Cuba. That's not because of Helms-Burton, but because Havana still doesn't get it. Businessmen invest to make a profit, not to do Castro and his revolution any favors. In the meantime, Americans should hope that outside capital would flow into the island. When Castro's reign ends, it is not in our interest to acquire another economic basket case in the Caribbean. Haiti is enough. And Cuba is larger and closer than Haiti. We will be drawn into its reconstruction whether we like it or not.