Bosnia pullout postponed indefinitely

0 Comments | Insight on the News, Nov 11, 1996 | by John Hillen

Contrary to the Clinton administration's promise that all U.S. troops would be out of Bosnia before the end of the year, thousands of American soldiers can look forward to spending not only Christmas but Easter as well in the Balkans. We know this because the administration recently admitted, for the first time, that it had extensive military plans for U.S. "peacekeepers" in the peaceless region well into 1997.

Specifically, Defense Secretary William Perry said he immediately was deploying 5,000 new U.S. troops as part of a "covering force" that will remain in Bosnia until at least March of next year. Now, a covering force usually is meant to provide protection for another force withdrawing under fire. But since there's no combat in Bosnia at the moment, the "cover" in this case must be of the political kind.

The Clinton administration needs it. They would like nothing more than for the American people to believe this covering force is absolutely, for sure, without question the last time U.S. soldiers will have to trek off to Bosnia. But if I'm reading the tea leaves correctly, the administration merely may be waiting until after the elections to spring the news that the peacekeeping mission suddenly is more "open-ended."

For its part, Congress has not been happy about the administration's furtive maneuverings. In recent hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, indignant lawmakers from both parties castigated Perry and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. John Shalikashvili for failing to inform Congress about the new commitment or about possible plans for an ongoing troop presence. Committee Chairman Sen. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina advised the defense duo that "notification and policy by press release do not constitute consultation with the Congress." Sen. John McCain, an Arizona Republican, reminded them that the House and Senate authorization for the Bosnia mission lasts only until December, after which they would be operating without congressional approval.

None of this seemed to faze Perry and Shalikashvili, who were unapologetic about keeping Congress and the nation in the dark about a protracted American presence in Bosnia. Both men backed up former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke's assessment that Bosnia would "implode" if American troops were withdrawn in a few months. Apparently, the administration has held this view for more than six months; somebody just forgot to tell Congress there was no intention of pulling out U.S. troops by December 1996 as promised.

Adm. Leighton Smith, the former commander of the Bosnia implementation force, or IFOR, recently testified before the same committee that in early 1996 his orders were "clarified" to plan on keeping his full force in Bosnia until December, instead of beginning their withdrawal this fall. Yet Shalikashvili told the committee he had no knowledge of this major change in the IFOR commander's operational guidance. Amazed by this response, McCain asked Shalikashvili to explain, in writing, how such an oversight could happen. McCain left the hearings complaining of an administration "credibility gap as wide as the Grand Canyon."

Then there's the problem of the "success gap." Simply put, the administration-brokered Dayton Peace Plan has done little to ease the tensions that led the Bosnian factions to war in the first place. The military "success" achieved to date in Bosnia -- keeping the parties separated -- has worked in direct contravention to the political goal of Dayton -- bringing the parties together. Not that there aren't steps IFOR could take to move the process along, such as hunting down war criminals and enforcing the right of refugees to return to their homes. But the priority for IFOR was clear from day one: Avoid casualties at all costs in an election year.

The result: The tremendous amount of work that remains to be done has created a need for IFOR II -- a force that will carry out one of four NATO options, although we can't be sure which one. What we can be sure of is this: The United States will be heavily involved in such a force.

This is how the Europeans want it. They have made it clear they will keep troops in Bosnia only as long as there is an American ground presence. By contrast, Perry has laid down no criteria for U.S. troop involvement, leaving NATO planners with only one default scenario -- have the United States continue to do the heavy lifting, providing the bulk of the troops and most of the material.

This puts the United States in a weak position, awaiting NATO planning options that will keep America involved in Bosnia through 1997 and beyond. A better policy would be to start coaxing our European allies into assuming more responsibility for Bosnia which, after all, is in their backyard. There is even a mechanism already in place to do this. The Combined Joint Task Force concept, approved by NATO in June, would allow a European-led force to borrow some limited NATO assets for missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. That concept must be taken off the drawing board and given its debut in Bosnia.