U.S. policy toward Cuba - Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, May 22, 1995 - Transcript

US Department of State Dispatch, May 29, 1995

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on U.S. policy toward Cuba. I know this subject is of great interest to the subcommittee's members and, indeed, to the Congress as a whole.

There has been considerable discussion and debate in the press, in these halls, and in the community of those who care deeply about Cuba concerning recent steps taken by the Administration to further regularize our migration relations with Cuba. Another important debate is taking place with regard to proposed legislation on Cuba now before the Congress. I am here today not only to explain the Administration's position on these issues, but to place them in the context of the situation which prevails in Cuba today and our overall policy toward that troubled country.

Despite the regime's strenuous efforts to resist them, the winds of change are beginning to blow across Cuba. Economic measures which would have been unthinkable only a few short years ago are being tolerated, with other, potentially more significant changes reportedly under consideration. The dramatic trends toward democracy, respect for human rights, and open markets that have swept the rest of the Western Hemisphere have not yet had an impact on Cuba, but they inevitably will. We strongly believe that U.S. policy must continue to play an important role in hastening the change that must soon come and in shaping the nature of the transition so that it unfolds in a peaceful and democratic manner.

For over 30 years, during both Republican and Democratic Administrations, the overarching goal of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been to promote a peaceful transition to a democratic society which recognizes fundamental freedoms and respects human rights. We are resolute in our opposition to the undemocratic regime of Fidel Castro, but we have no hostile intent toward the Cuban people. Quite the contrary, the Cuban Democracy Act - CDA, which passed with strong bipartisan support in 1992 and which this Administration has faithfully implemented, is the cornerstone of our policy which puts pressure on the Cuban Government through diplomatic isolation and economic embargo while at the same time directing humanitarian assistance, information, and support to the Cuban people, including those who engage in peaceful struggle for human rights and democracy. Also consistent with the CDA, we remain prepared to respond to significant political and economic reform in Cuba with carefully calibrated measures.

The Situation in Cuba Today

Mr. Chairman, I would like to spend a few minutes discussing current economic and political conditions in Cuba.

As many experts have noted, Cuba's economy entered into a steep decline following the collapse of the Soviet bloc beginning in 1989, even though the unilateral U.S. embargo had been in effect for a much longer time. Prior to 1989, the Soviet Union pumped $4 to $6 billion of assistance and subsidies into the Cuban economy each year, almost one-third of Cuba's gross domestic product at the time. The loss of this aid and preferential trade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was devastating and exposed the Cuban economy's essential structural weaknesses. Cuba has not published economic statistics since 1989, but according to unofficial Cuban estimates the island's economic output has fallen by over 50%, to just over $10 billion.

Cuba's economic free fall has had a disastrous impact on the Cuban people's standard of living. Ordinary Cubans struggle daily against scarcity. Their state ration coupons provide barely enough food for half the month, and they must scramble to find ways to get through the rest. Many Cubans must travel long distances to work on bicycles since gasoline is very expensive and can rarely be bought with pesos. Workers whose creativity and enterprise are stifled by the state-controlled system lack motivation; those who do not accept the party line risk unemployment or worse.

The Cuban Government's response to this increasingly dire situation has been slow and stubborn. For four years, the regime took no significant steps to confront its own economic imbalances or alleviate the growing suffering of the population. It sought to blame the U.S. embargo for its ills - a charge rejected by nearly all independent analysts - and denied that its glaring problems were the result of its obsolete economic system. Finally, in 1993, the government began adopting tentative measures which have included the legalization of the dollar and of tightly circumscribed self-employment, and the establishment of agricultural and industrial craft markets. The government also converted large, state-run farms into state cooperatives and leased some land to individual families. In a particularly odd marriage of convenience, the Cuban leadership has aggressively courted foreign investment - something it previously considered anathema - to provide the capital it needs "to save socialism."

Each of these small steps has moved Cuba away from the Marxist economic model that has retarded its development, suffocated private enterprise, and denied ordinary Cubans the right to make their own economic decisions. Each of the steps, however, also has been carefully limited to preserve the regime's control over economic and political life on the island. For example, cooperatives and farmers must still sell the vast majority of their produce to the government at prices it sets. Self-employment is only permitted in a few occupations, and those involved may hire only family members. University graduates may not participate at all in self-employment initiatives. Cuba's current investment climate still ranks among the world's riskiest, most arbitrary, and least attractive.