The Cuban Democracy Act and US policy toward Cuba - statement by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Robert S. Gelbard - Transcript

US Department of State Dispatch, August 17, 1992

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to review with you US policy toward Cuba and our views on the Cuban Democracy Act (HR 5323). I commend the thorough review Congress has given this legislation. As you are aware, last week, I testified before the Subcommittee for Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, in April, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This has been a truly bipartisan effort. On behalf of the Administration, I would like to thank you and the bill's sponsors for considering our views on how best to bring democracy to Cuba.

I understand that your interests are in the trade provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act, and I welcome a full discussion of these issues. However, I would like to begin by putting the legislation into the context of US policy toward Cuba.

A Successful Policy

In the last few years, our policy has succeeded in helping to significantly diminish Cuban support for insurgency abroad and terminate Cuba's special relationship with the former Soviet Union. Today, Cuba stands alone. No government has stretched out a hand to stop the inevitable decay and disappearance of the Cuban dictatorship. No government has attempted to replace the former Soviet Union's military and political ties with Cuba - quite the contrary. Russia's relationship with Cuba has withered to the point that it now has little inclination to support Cuban intransigence.

Cuba's position in the world community and at home is far different from what it was only a few years ago. Today, leaders around the world are pressing the Castro regime to adopt representative democracy and end its repression of human rights. In Madrid - as in Guadalajara - Castro's vision was rejected by his Latin American colleagues. A few weeks ago, at the Ibero-American summit, the leaders of Latin America, Spain, and Portugal made it clear to Castro they wanted change in Cuba when they called for "representative" democracy in the final communique. Not Cuban-style "democracy" but a true democracy in which the people of Cuba freely elect their leaders and democratic institutions give legitimacy to a successor government.

The UN Human Rights Commission has called on Cuba to stop abuses of human rights. The Russian ambassador to Geneva hosted Cuban human rights activists during last year's Commission meeting in Geneva, and Russia voted in that Commission to send a Special UN Rapporteur to Cuba to investigate the human rights situation there. Sadly, the Castro regime has refused to allow a UN review of its human rights record. Rather, it has continued to subject those who disagree with the regime to mob attack and arbitrary arrest.

Today, Cuba's attempts to establish productive relations with the successor states of the former Soviet Union are little more than cosmetic posturing and do little to conceal the final and irreversible removal of the residue of Soviet power in Cuba. Soviet - now Russian - troops are leaving Cuba. Soviet - now Russian - technical advisers, once estimated at 8,000, now can be counted in the hundreds. All economic aid and subsidized trade, which peaked at an estimated $5 billion a year, have ended. Total two-way trade between Russia and Cuba in 1992 may amount to an estimated $500 million compared to $8.7 billion in 1989.

The withdrawal of support from the former Soviet Union and, now, Russia means that Cuba can no longer support insurgency abroad. Just a few short years ago, Cuba had 50,000 troops in Africa. They now number in the hundreds. Namibia is independent and democratic. Cuban troops are out of Angola, and it is not controlled by a Marxist-Leninist regime. Cuban troops have left Ethiopia and Somalia. Cuba has little influence in Africa. The same is true for Latin America. There is peace in Central America. Castro lost the election to [Nicaraguan President] Violeta Chamorro just as surely as did Daniel Ortega. The peace settlement in El Salvador was the death knell for Cuban-style communism in Latin America.

The significantly diminished Cuban support for insurgency and the demise of Cuba's symbiotic relationship with the Soviet Union did not just happen. It happened because of a strong and active Bush Administration policy to discourage Soviet - and later Russian - support for Cuba. President Bush and Secretary Baker wasted no words in letting [Soviet] President Gorbachev and, subsequently, [Russian] President Yeltsin know that we expected Soviet military and economic support to Cuba to end. President Gorbachev took the unprecedented measure of announcing to the world - without first advising the Cubans - that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Cuba. President Yeltsin followed this initiative by terminating subsidized oil shipments to Cuba, by slashing military aid, and by placing aid projects on a commercial basis.

Cuba Today

In 1989, could anyone have predicted that Castro, who once deplored tourism, would, in 1992, be frantically struggling to keep Cuba's fragile economy afloat by begging for Western investment in tourism? Could anyone have told us that the Cuban economy would shrink by 50%, that Cubans would be reduced to bicycles and oxen as their principal modes of transportation, or that Cuba's military machine would be degraded? Cuba can no longer project its power abroad. Perhaps up to half its MiGs are mothballed, many tanks and artillery are in storage and, to save fuel, anti-aircraft guns are being towed by troops pedaling oversized tricycles. Cuba's self-proclaimed victories abroad must be ashes in the mouths of those who must till the field and harvest potatoes rather than sow the seeds of revolution.