START treaty sent to Congress - Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

US Department of State Dispatch, Dec 9, 1991 by George Bush

START Treaty Sent to Congress

President Bush

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991. The START Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof:

* The Annex on Agreed Statements ("Agreed Statements Annex");

* The Annex on Terms and Their Definitions ("Definitions Annex");

* The Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("Conversion or Elimination Protocol");

* The Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Related to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with 12 annexes ("Inspection Protocol");

* The Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("Notification Protocol");

* The Protocol on ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] Throw-weight Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("Throw-weight Protocol");

* The Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("Telemetry Protocol");

* The Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Protocol"); and

* The Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with 10 annexes ("Memorandum of Understanding").

In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate, the Report of the Department of State and documents associated with, but not integral parts of, the START Treaty. These documents are of four types: separate executive agreements related to the Treaty; letters embodying executive agreements on various aspects of the Treaty; declarations regarding specific systems that do not fall within the scope of the Treaty; and a variety of statements and correspondence concerning aspects of the negotiation of the Treaty. Although not submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, these documents are relevant to the consideration of the Treaty by the Senate.

The START Treaty represents a nearly decade-long effort by the United States and the Soviet Union to address the nature and magnitude of the threat that strategic nuclear weapons pose to both countries and to the world in general. The fundamental premise of START is that, despite significant political differences, the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest in reducing the risk of nuclear war and enhancing strategic stability.

The United States had several objectives in the START negotiations.

First, we consistently held the view that the START Treaty must enhance stability in times of crisis. The strategic nuclear forces remaining after implementation of START--as well as during the period when weapons are reduced--should be such as to reduce Soviet incentives to provoke a crisis or to strike first during a crisis. Stability in times of crisis will remain important even in the post-Cold War era; no one can predict the future, and the purpose of this Treaty is to regulate the strategic threat for many years to come. Among the many measures we sought to fulfill this objective, the most important were the preferential treatment given to stabilizing systems, such as bombers and cruise missiles, the stringent limits on deployed ballistic missiles and their reentry vehicles, and the special, restrictive limits on heavy ICBMs, the most destabilizing weapons in existence.

Second, we sought an agreement that did not simply limit strategic arms, but that reduced them significantly below current levels. A successful combination of this objective with that of a stabilizing force structure can serve for many years as a linch-pin in shaping our strategic posture, and, if appropriate, can serve as a basis for future agreements that will lead to further reductions. Moreover, in order for the Treaty to work smoothly over many years, its terms must be as precise and unambiguous as possible. Neither Party should have any doubt as to the limitations and obligations that are imposed by the terms of the Treaty.