International crime-fighting strategies - Robert S. Gelbard, Asst. Sec. for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs - Transcript

US Department of State Dispatch, Dec, 1995

Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, December 7, 1995

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Our foreign law enforcement, democracy, and broad rule of law programs all work together on a continuum. They are integral to the success of every foreign policy objective we have set for ourselves. This is because solid judicial and law enforcement systems, which operate effectively and enjoy public confidence, are basic to advancing the growth in democracy we have seen and are supporting around the world. The President has been emphatic about the Administration's determination to counter international criminal elements which undermine our goals. As he said at the United Nations when he announced his international crime initiative:

Nowhere is cooperation more vital

than in fighting the increasingly

interconnected groups that traffic in

terror, organized crime, and drug

smuggling.

The Administration departments and agencies represented at this table each play an important role in our endeavors, as do numerous other federal organizations not present. This is testament to the enormity of the task we face and the complexity of the policies and activities we have undertaken to achieve our goals. The importance of what we are trying to do is immeasurably heightened for reasons that are perfectly clear. The nations of the world are no longer divided into two basic camps. Each day, our world becomes more interdependent, and we now face universal threats to our peace and security.

The growing phenomenon of transnational crime is a trend which, unchecked, can destroy the many remarkable advances around the world. International criminal elements corrupt emerging democracies, free-market economies, and our citizens' security. We urgently need to work with the international community to stop the advance of the criminal underground. Nowhere has this been more apparent to me than in Russia--one of my stops on a two-week trip to that part of the world from which I recently returned.

Since we last met with this committee on this important subject, the Administration has worked hard to develop policies and programs to attack the international criminal networks which directly affect the health and well-being of all Americans. Further, we have worked hard to do this in a manner that farthers our fundamental interests in fostering the rule of law abroad. The effort involves many people and organizations, and there are growing pains. Indeed, our systems are not perfect; however, the will is there, and the goals of the various institutions are the same. As each day passes, we have a better idea of what we are dealing with, and our track record shows the ability for fast, flexible responses to lightning-speed political developments. We can point to concrete achievements.

Our umbrella strategy against international crime containing political and programmatic tactics involving a wide variety of initiatives. To foster a universal approach in the foreign policy context, the Secretary of State, two years ago, broadened the scope of my bureau to include coordination of overseas law enforcement activities through the creation of the Office of International Criminal Justice. Since then, we have undertaken a wide range of anti-crime initiatives. Some of them are far-reaching and require considerable time for execution. Others we have been able to effect quickly in response to immediate foreign policy objectives.

As we continue our efforts in this important arena, we have discovered that much of the work we have carried out against major drug traffickers and their money-laundering operations is entirely applicable to combating transnational crime. This is true whether we consider strategies, political pressures, training and technical assistance, or provision of equipment. Ultimately, institution-building is key; we have seen this in Colombia. I dare say progress in Colombia in bringing down top traffickers would not have been possible were it not for the considerable strengthening we have fostered in Colombia's law enforcement and judicial organizations. Certain safeguards have helped to ensure, in the Colombian model, that police training supports our broader human rights, rule of law, and democracy objectives. The flexibility to train police, in keeping with our other foreign policy objectives, is central to our ability to attack transnational crime.

Anti-Crime Training Initiative

We learned from our experience with international narcotics control that one of the most effective ways to get immediate results is to provide law enforcement training in the most threatened countries where we are able to conduct programs. In this way, we achieve two primary tangible benefits. First, trustworthy links are established between U.S. and foreign law enforcement entities that help roll back organized crime's move into the United States. Second, improved foreign law enforcement expertise heightens national ability to control organized crime and specific major crime problems that negatively affect the growth of free markets and democracy.