Religious Freedom in Russia Today

Ecumenical Review, The, Oct, 1998 by Vladimir Feodorov

New religious movements have been the prime stimulus for serious reflection and debate on religious freedom and guarantees of freedom of conscience in Russia today. While the missionary task of the Orthodox Church is obvious, the church should not accomplish that task by relying on the power structures of the state using ways and means that are improper and unacceptable in a democratic society. The law proclaiming freedom of conscience in Russia is extremely important, but securing the realization of this freedom is equally critical. And with the weight of 70 years of repression on our shoulders, we are still a long way from the full implementation of the law.

The 1997 law

The law on the freedom of conscience adopted in Russia in 1997 merits a thorough and detailed analysis. Here I shall not engage in a legal evaluation of it but rather focus on its place in Russian public opinion: the degree to which it suits the masses and the extent to which it reflects (or fails to reflect) the level of maturity of Russian legal consciousness.

Thirty-five years ago I heard the liberal Russian thinker Alexander Hertzen say that "the people should not be freed outwardly any more than they are free inwardly". This helped me to understand why and how the Bolsheviks came to power during the time of political freedom gained in the February 1917 revolution and how freedom of speech quickly gave way to a totalitarian regime (which however operated under the guise of democratic slogans). I have reflected on this anew since 1991 when events led to the loss of leadership by the communist party, the failure of communist ideology and the destruction of the socialist system. The freedom abruptly gained at that time intoxicated people to various degrees; as a result, it is difficult to predict today with any degree of confidence the direction in which Russian democracy may develop.

From this perspective, it seems to me that comparing Russia's 1997 law with similar laws in democracies whose political histories and social settings are much different from Russia's may lead to fallacious conclusions regarding the prospects of democracy in Russia. The passing of the law by the parliament and its signing by the president should come as no surprise. The heart of the matter is not that there is a strong pro-communist political tendency in the parliament, but that if this law were submitted to a referendum, it would surely be supported by the majority.

A considerable part of the population is made up of people who are not religious believers and who do not think they can affect political matters in any case. They displayed no reaction to the 1997 law one way or the other; and if a referendum on it were to be held, they would be neither for nor against it.

A second part of the citizenry, also without religion, has been accustomed to some form or other of state control and totalitarian ideology, They would approve the introduction of state controls on and counter-measures to foreign religious influences -- not because they are prepared to accept Orthodox Christianity, but because they see foreign influence as an active destructive force. Most communists would belong to this group.