Ethical disagreement as an obstacle to ecclesial communion

Ecumenical Review, The, April, 1996 by Bruce Williams

As a step towards clarifying the various sources and kinds of disagreement on ethical matters in terms of their impact on ecclesial koinonia -- and also to highlight the real though imperfect koinonia which does exist among Christians with regard to such matters -- it may be useful to address ethical issues according to the following three-level distinction:

Level A refers to basic principles which always demand respect, inasmuch as shared commitment to such principles is itself a partial constituent of Christian koinonia.

Examples of such principles would include reverence for the unique dignity of each person as a creature in God's image; affirmation of the fundamental equality of all men and women; pursuit of nonviolent strategies in human interrelationships at all levels; responsibility towards "have-nots" on the part of "haves"; esteem for sexual integrity ("chastity"), the fidelity and stability of marital love and the uprightness of family life; concern for future generations of human beings; responsible stewardship of the environment.

Level B refers to more specific practical norms which seek to uphold the level-A principles, and which serve as more or less proximate guides to action.

Examples of such norms would include specific positions taken with regard to the morality of war, capital punishment, abortion, contraception, artificial procreation and divorce.

Level C refers more immediately to decisions about action, looking towards the concrete realization of level-A principles.

Examples of this would include the particular pastoral directives or guidance offered by churches to help their members (and even the wider society) to address such challenges as disarmament, crime control, family stability, responsible parenthood, the distribution of food and other vital resources and environmental protection.

* Bruce Williams, OP, is on the faculty of theology, Pontifical University of St Thomas (Angelicum), Rome.

Applying this three-level distinction to the question of ecclesial communion, we suggest that disagreement on ethical issues should be seen as prohibiting full ecclesial communion whenever, but only when, it involves contradictory institutional positions at level A -- that is, when diverse Christian communities institutionally hold irreconcilably conflicting attitudes towards one or more of the basic principles which are essentially constitutive of human and Christian community.

Such incompatibility might come about in any of the following ways:

1. The disagreement directly and expressly concerns one of the basic level-A principles. For example, for some Christians, a broadly positive affirmation of homosexual orientation and practice is at the basis of their self-definition as a church (the Metropolitan Community Church), whereas many if not most other churches reject such an affirmation as directly contrary to explicit biblical revelation about the basic meaning of human sexuality.

2. The disagreement directly concerns a specific practical norm (level B) which some church or churches assert as necessarily and inseparably connected with a basic level-A principle, while other churches hold either that this specific norm is unsound or (even if possibly not unsound) that it lacks a strictly binding connection with the level-A principle in question. For example, some churches insist that absolute pacifism is the only stance even minimally consistent with the gospel attitude of nonviolence (e.g. Mennonites), or that the absolute disallowance of contraception is the only norm even minimally consistent with authentic conjugal love (Roman Catholic magisterium), implying that the less absolute position of other churches on these points is a radical betrayal of the corresponding level-A commitments which are indispensable for full Christian koinonia.

3. The disagreement concerns pastoral regulations or guidelines (level C) in a way that reflects contradictory level-A positions on the essential structure of the church. For example, some churches affirm, while others deny, that believers may legitimately divorce and remarry at their own free choice unregulated by any pastoral norms whatever. This is affirmed by most Protestant churches, while denied by the Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Anglican churches. In this case, even if there is general agreement that the dissolution of marriages in certain cases can be theologically consistent with the basic normative principle of lifelong marital permanence, the disagreement reflects incompatible level-A attitudes as to the nature of the ecclesial communion within which Christian marriage is situated.

It is evident that any chance of resolving our outstanding disagreements on ethical issues -- and, meanwhile, of assessing the impact of such disagreements on our koinonia -- depends upon first identifying correctly the nature of the disagreement in each case. It may be that some issues (such as contraception) involve more than one of the three areas of disagreement, i.e. a combination of types 2 and 3. Or perhaps, some disagreements which are ostensibly of type 2 turn out to be primarily of type 3. This could help explain why arguments over so many ethical matters almost invariably turn into arguments about church authority.