Supreme Court Cases 2000-2001 term - Legal Digest - constitutional law

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,The, Jan, 2002

During the 2000-2001 term, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on several significant constitutional issues relating to criminal law and procedure, as well as cases involving the civil liability of law enforcement officers acting in the performance of their official duties and one case involving the civil liability of state agencies for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The following is a brief synopsis of these cases. As always, local and state agencies must insure that their own state laws and constitutions have not provided even greater protections than the U.S. constitutional standards before relying on these opinions.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000)

In 1990, the Supreme Court held that brief, suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purpose of combating drunk driving was constitutional. (1) In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court ruled that when the primary purpose of the checkpoint is to locate illegal drugs, the seizure involved is unconstitutional.

A vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (2) Supreme Court checkpoint cases have recognized limited exceptions to the general Fourth Amendment rule that a seizure must be justified by some measure of individualized suspicion. In Edmond, the Court declined to add narcotics checkpoints to the limited exceptions.

The opinion distinguished the narcotics checkpoint from the drunk driving checkpoint by examining the motive for the respective stops. The Court recognized that the drunk driving checkpoint was clearly aimed at reducing the immediate hazard posed by drunk drivers on the highways. On the other hand, "[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints..., stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion." (3)

It is important to note that Justice O'Connor's majority opinion acknowledged that certain emergency situations likely would permit checkpoints even if their primary purpose was ordinary crime control. O'Connor agreed with the lower appellate court's proposition that the "Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route." (4) Edmond, however, signals the end of routine narcotics checkpoints.

Illinois v. McArthur, 121 S. Ct. 946 (2001)

The Supreme Court held that a police officer's refusal to allow residents to enter their homes without a police officer until a search warrant was obtained was a reasonable seizure that did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Police officers, with probable cause to believe that McArthur had hidden marijuana in his home, knocked on McArthur's door and requested his consent to search his home. He refused. The investigating police officers then told McArthur that he was to stay outside of his home and could not reenter it unless accompanied by a police officer. McArthur was prevented from entering the home unaccompanied for about 2 hours while the police obtained a search warrant. When the warrant was issued, the officers searched McArthur's home and found drug paraphernalia and marijuana, resulting in McArthur's arrest. He was charged with misdemeanor possession of those items. He moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was the "fruit" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him ree nter his home unaccompanied.

The central requirement of the Fourth Amendment is one of reasonableness. Although seizures of personal property are presumed unreasonable unless accomplished pursuant to a warrant, there are exceptions to this rule involving special law enforcement needs and diminished expectations of privacy. The Court recognized that the circumstances in this case were exigent, and the seizure of McArthur's home was tailored to that exigency: it was as limited in time as possible and as unintrusive as possible. (5) In reaching its decision, the Court balanced both privacy and law enforcement concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.

The Court cited four reasons for its conclusion that the seizure of McArthur's home was reasonable. First, the police had probable cause to believe that McArthur's home contained evidence of a crime and unlawful drugs. Second, they had good reason to fear that, unless the home was seized, he would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant. Third, they avoided an unnecessary, warrantless entry and warrantless arrest simply by preventing McArthur from entering his home unaccompanied (McArthur was not detained). Fourth, they imposed the restraint for a limited period, only as long as reasonably necessary for them, acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant.

The third and fourth points made by the Court are the most important considerations to law enforcement. The determination of reasonableness is based on the specific facts of each case, that is; the specific circumstances and the options available to--and ultimately taken by--the police. The fact that the police waited outside McArthur's home, thus minimizing the time spent inside without a warrant, was a significant consideration to the Court. Anything police can do to be less intrusive to the subject's privacy will be well received by a court later evaluating their reasonableness. Like any temporary Fourth Amendment seizure (such as an investigative detention), any unnecessary delay or lack of investigative diligence may render a seizure unreasonable. Obviously the warrant must be secured as quickly as possible, to include consideration of a telephonic warrant or any other means to limit the delay. New and emerging technologies are decreasing the time to acquire a warrant. Failing to take advantage of a tele phonic or other enhanced method of securing a warrant may render the delay unnecessarily long and, therefore, unreasonable.