Australia's Role In East Timor

Then in late 1976 in Australia, the Liberal-National Party returned to office, with Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister and Andrew Peacock as Minister for Foreign Affairs. From Jakarta, meanwhile, Australia's Ambassador Richard Woolcott was urging acceptance of the political realities in Timor. The United States considered the matter minor; the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders supported Indonesia; and there was little criticism of Indonesia's action within the Third World. Then in January 1978, Australia granted de jure recognition of Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor.

Despite Australia's de jure recognition of the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor, Australia's political relationship with Indonesia in the early 1980s remained bedevilled by the Timor issue. The Australian Government tried to maintain good relations with Indonesia but the Australian media and some pressure groups were determined not to allow the matter of East Timor to rest, and continued criticism of Indonesia. The invasion roused strong anti-Indonesian sentiments in the Australian press, which held, among others, Jakarta responsible for the deaths of five Australian journalists who travelled to the border region between (then) Portuguese Timor and Indonesian Timor to cover the war. The constant criticism in the Australian media was, on the other hand, resented in Indonesia, whose Government argued that by their invasion of East Timor they had saved Australia from the prospect of having a 'Cuba on the doorstep'. They were irritated by what they saw as Australian interference in their internal affairs.

Of course, part of the problem is that many Australians who know little of either Indonesian (or Asian) culture or contemporary history often seek to impose their own standards on what is a very different society from their own. On the other hand, many Indonesians, even at high government levels, find aspects of Australian society also hard to understand. The Australian Government professes friendship to Indonesia; yet Radio Australia broadcasts, in Bahasa, Indonesian material that is often critical of the Indonesian Government, which the local Indonesian media could not cover. The Australian Government tries to avoid controversy by saying that Radio Australia is a semi-independent statutory authority which may have some policy attitudes different from those of the Australian Government of the day. The Indonesians find it hard also to accept that the democratic Australian Government has almost no control over the print media. It is fair to say that the Australian dilemma over Timor emphasised once again the difficulties which have confronted Australia regarding its relations with a close and volatile neighbour.

For thirty years Australia had been able to base its foreign policy on the assumption of a stable political environment in the Indonesian archipelago. During the last ten years it had, in addition, been able to anticipate a growing and mutually beneficial economic relationship with an 'Indonesian tiger' economy moving inexorably up the list of Australia's most important economic partners. And, unlike some of the other countries of Asia, Indonesia until recently had not been a source of 'boat people', refugees or illegal migrants in any number despite the proximity of the two territories and the great disparity in living conditions.