The Undertones Of The Sri Lankan Conflict

The fourth rule is 'that the secessionists should be able to make a reasonable claim to be a national group'. The Tamils in Sri Lanka can undoubtedly claim to be a distinct community, but they are too dispersed geographically and are not as a whole concentrated in the territory, which the LTTE claims. Indeed many Tamils have been living for ages in what the LTTE rhetoric refers to as 'Sinhala Areas'. It is most unlikely that these preponderant numbers would agree to leave these areas for a new life in 'Eelam'. They mingle freely with the Sinhalese: they own property, work freely in the public service and in business on equal terms; they intermarry; their children attend the same schools and they share all public facilities without hindrance. This fact, by the way, undermines any accusation that Tamils are a persecuted group.

This brings us to a consideration of a fifth rule, which is outside the article in the Economist: 'are the secession-seeking group and the dominant community so incompatible that severance is the oniy option?' On the other hand, is the perception of incompatibility shared only by a power-hungry political elite that has chosen to play upon ethnic differences? Exploiting ethnic differences as an easy road to power is a common modus operandi of politicians. The LTTE is doing just that. It has created a generation of brainwashed people who have been conditioned from childhood -- as child soldiers -- to hate the Sinhalese. Their suicide bombers are the products of such robotic material.

Tamils are not persecuted in Sri Lanka. Even the Tamil leaders of the past who argued for autonomy did not go on record saying that Tamils were persecuted. Some Tamil leaders held portfolios in successive Sinhala-dominated governments of the past. Surely the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is a Tamil, would not remain in a government, which persecutes Tamils. Furthermore, not a single court case has ever been filed invoking the strong provisions available in the Constitution, then and now, alleging discrimination on the grounds of race in Sri Lanka. And, mind you, Tamils have graced top positions in the judiciary. These are telling objective indices that refute any charges of persecution or serious discrimination. There was the riot of 1983. But that was not a grassroots movement like, for instance, ethnic riots in places like Kosovo or in parts of Africa. The riot was organised by a handful of politicians with the aid of the urban underworld. The scale and intensity of that campaign was relatively small and confined largely to a few Colombo suburbs.

The Sinhalese community has not been guilty of acts like forceful assimilation, threats to Tamil culture or ethnic cleansing. There are numerous common strands in cultural attributes between the two communities. The Buddhist ethic, dominant among the Sinhalese, as well as the latter's exposure to modernised western ways, have made them, by and large, a tolerant and non-insular community. The Sinhalese have never been a conquering or militant civilization. This milieu partly explains why they have never resorted to backlash action since 1983 despite countless provocative attacks by the LTTE. These attacks included the slaughtering of 30 Buddhist monks at Arantalawa while on their way to an alms-giving ceremony, the killing of innocent devotees at one of the most sacred shrines of Buddhists, the Sin Maha Bodhi, and, most provocative of all, the bombing of the most cherished possession of Sinhalese Buddhist civiisation, the Dalada Maligawa. Indeed it may be said that the passiveness displayed by the Sinhalese i n the face of such offences is rare in the world's sad history of ethnic conflict.