Taiwan And Mainland China

Contemporary Review, June, 2001 by Peter Kien-hong Yu

The last need could be regarded as using Taiwanization as a weapon during Taiwan elections. This need cannot be ruled out, because some local, provincial, and national level politicians do get elected by uttering Taiwan First (Taiwan youxian), especially in those electoral districts having mainlanders as candidates, even the pro-reunification party, the New Party, had to say the same thing in the last several years. In other words, mainlanders must eventually be assimilated. People living in Taiwan must think in terms of the Taiwan area only. If they think in terms of both mainland China and Taiwan, there could be more frictions. The proponents argue that only in this way can harmony be maintained in Taiwan.

Before Zheng Chenggong (or Koxinga) went to Taiwan in 1661, there were about 50,000 Han people. In 1895, there were about 2.8 or 4 million native Taiwanese. In 1945, six million Taiwanese lived on the island. At the turn of the twenty-first century, there were more than 23 million people.

Throughout the last century the people of Taiwan have held different views of their outside rulers. There existed from the 1920s to the 1940s two basic schools of thought when Taiwan was colonized by Imperial Japan: one is called the Taiwan school with such figures as Lin Xiantang and the other, the motherland school, with members like Jiang Weishui. The former group had been supported by the majority native Taiwanese and it wants only to promote Taiwanese interests and happiness, whereas the latter hopes that a strong China will take care of Taiwan. In other words, the Taiwan school of thought is more pragmatic and the other group, idealistic. In any case, both groups were against Japanese colonialism and embraced Chinese nationalism. To be certain, the Taiwan group also regarded themselves as Chinese.

The striking difference between the two periods is that, today, Chen Shui-bian, for example, is still politically reluctant to say that he is a Chinese. At most, he would say he is a Huaren. There is a difference between the two usages. And, since Lee Teng-hui became the ROC President, the probability of native Taiwanese clashing with the Chinese on the mainland increased a lot, as attested by the renewed military exercises conducted by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) since July 1995.

Taiwan is not living alone. It is not the only political entity in this world. The United States can certainly change the Taiwanization process. President Bill Clinton in June 1998 specifically ruled out, for example, American support of a de jure independent Taiwan. So, this means that Taiwanization has its limits. Without the American military umbrella, Taiwan cannot survive for a long period of time after the PLA's attack. In April Washington gave its strongest statement of support for Taiwan in many years.

Indeed, the existence of the Japan factor may help to deepen the Taiwanization process. The new American President George W. Bush certainly wants Tokyo to play a bigger role in Northeast Asia. Taiwan's leaders would be forced to move closer to Japan, if there were political and military pressures from Beijing. Beijing may also perceive Japan's navy as being currently more powerful than the Chinese PLA's navy, and, therefore, Beijing reluctantly chose to spend the next several decades to solve the 'Taiwan question' peacefully, so long as Taipei is willing to accept the One China principle. Because the attempt to resolve the issue has become political, Taipei can play games as well, thereby prolonging its survival. There are also incidents elsewhere which can increase the ROC's bargaining chips vis-a-vis the PRC. The April 1, 2001 mid-air collision off Hainan Island between an American spy plane and a Chinese Communist jet fighter is one good example. Relations between the United States and the PRC have certai nly been strained. George W. Bush may well be more sympathetic to the future of Taiwan by helping it to acquire more advanced weapons.