Taiwan And Mainland China

Contemporary Review, June, 2001 by Peter Kien-hong Yu

Because there is ideological chaos, the young should learn to be more pragmatic when they grow up. They have to learn to live above the fray, that is, they should find a way that is more objective or, at least, closer to the majority view.

The existence of residents from other provinces (waishengren or Mainlanders living in Taiwan) is another issue. Most mainlanders of the older generation, who went to Taiwan after the political division of (the Republic of) China in October 1949, hold a greater China mentality. But, their children were born in Taiwan. Given time, most of them would gradually identify with Taiwan and learn to speak Taiwanese for the sake of survival. In December 1998, the term New Taiwanese became in vogue. This political jargon actually includes both new and old Taiwanese. But, the question is that, when there are no more mainlanders in Taiwan, are not the Taiwan people dwarfing themselves in the context of China, unless they are after the creation of the Taiwan State or ROT, which can make them equal vis-a-vis the people on mainland China?

Taiwanization has also psychologically suffocated many mainlanders. If one does not call himself or herself a (new) Taiwanese, this person will be referred to by Taiwan independence fundamentalists as a huaren (Chinese). There is a distinction between huaren and Chinese. Huaren means those people with Chinese blood who live outside mainland China, while 'Chinese' refers to those people who live on the mainland. So, if one wants to become a Chinese, he or she should go back to China, meaning the mainland, currently under the control of the PRC or the CPC. This kind of "xenophobic" mentality also exists elsewhere, for example, in Malaysia.

The ultimate test will be party politics on the mainland. While most native Taiwanese want to preserve the opportunity to be their own masters, some of them want to be able to play a political role on mainland China.

In October 1991, the DPP passed a party programme, calling for the creation of the ROT through the referendum process. Ironically, in May 1999, the DPP passed a resolution saying it accepts the national title of ROC. With Chen Shui-bian's presidential victory in March 2000, there are only three more exciting scenarios left in Greater China. The first one we have in mind is whether or not China can be politically reunited, which will have a direct impact on Taiwanization. Second, whether the CPC allows a nation-wide, direct election to decide on a new Chinese leader for the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. This direct election on the mainland was also posed by the DPP chairman Hsieh. And third, whether the ruling party on the mainland can become an opposition party after its electoral defeat.

If Taiwan does not play a major role in those developments, Taiwan will, most likely, still be regarded as a marginal or peripheral place in Chinese history. When Chen spoke about Taiwan standing up in his inaugural speech and his followers doing the same in March 2001, they should make it clear that Taiwan should stand up in China and the world not just in that island.