Bomber Harris - Scapegoat Or Hero? - Review - book review

The Bomber War: Arthur Harris and the Allied Bomber Offensive 1939-1945. Robin Neillands. John Murray. [pound]25.00. 448 pages. ISBN 0-7195-5637-6.

Whether the Allied bombing offensive which played a major part in the defeat of Germany was morally justified is a question which has bothered the conscience of many over the past half-century. It is an issue which this well-researched book on the air war and, in particular on the role played by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris and RAF Bomber Command in the destruction of Dresden and other German cities, examines in depth. The myths about Bomber Command, the author asserts, are not yet as deeply ingrained or damaging as the myths about Britain's First War generals but he believes the process is well under way and is equally unjust.

Dresden, which was bombed in 1945, became a byword for aerial terrorism. Protesters, the majority of them with little if any experience of war, have continued to vilify 'Bomber' Harris and Bomber Command, which lost more than 55,000 aircrew, as 'terrorists', 'mass murderers' and 'war criminals'. A statue of Harris was drenched in red paint shortly after it was unveiled by the Queen Mother outside the RAF church in central London.

Misgivings over the toll of death and destruction rained down on Hamburg and Berlin as well as Dresden -- which were pounded by American bombers as well as the RAF -- were certainly voiced in Britain and elsewhere but of public dissent or protest there was none. On the contrary, the demand after Coventry and the London Blitz was for revenge. The bulk of the British people, as the author notes, was solidly behind the relentless bombing of Germany. Hindsight for some came later.

Sir Arthur Harris, who took over Bomber Command in the darkest days of the war, was stubborn, ruthless and single-minded in his belief that the Germans could be brought to their knees by bombing. They were, he observed grimly, sowing the wind and would reap the whirlwind. Churchill praised him as a man who would not flag or fail, someone who would fight to the finish whatever the cost. In other words, cometh the hour cometh the man. Harris did not flag but his name lives on, associated as it is with the destruction of Dresden. We must remember that bombing was not an exact science in 1945 nor, as the author points out, is it today if the Nato bombing of Kosovo is anything to go by. The bombing of Berlin, large areas of which were reduced to rubble failed, however, in its objective of stirring the Germans to rise in revolt against the Nazis. It was in effect a defeat for the RAF.

The continued 'area bombing' of towns and cities, instead of strategic targets such as oil supplies and transport, was undoubtedly a serious mistake. On the other hand, Dresden clearly was a legitimate target for selective, but not area, bombing despite the German claim that its factories produced only toothpaste and talcum. Whether its destruction was morally justified or even necessary in the closing months of the war with defeat staring the Germans in the face, is another matter. There are still many with no politically-motivated agenda who sincerely believe that it was not.

Harris's defence of himself and Bomber Command is clear-cut and straightforward. It bears and deserves another hearing. In his memoirs, published in 1947, he wrote: 'There is a widespread impression that I not only invented the policy of area bombing but also insisted on carrying it out in the face of natural reluctance to kill women and children felt by everyone else. The facts are otherwise. Such decisions on policy are not in any case made by Commanders-in-Chief in the field but by the Ministries, the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee and by the War Cabinet. The decision to attack large industrial areas was taken long before I became Commander-in-Chief'.

Sir Arthur Harris, who died in 1984, aged 91 felt aggrieved and slighted at the end of his career, not, perhaps, without reason. He complained that he was not consulted or invited to contribute to the official history of the air offensive directly concerned with his own Command. His official dispatch, written in 1945, was placed on the restricted list apparently because the Air Ministry took objection to it. From all this, the author says, it is not hard to infer that the RAF and the political establishment which had supported him during the war later decided to distance themselves from him and the odium created by the bombing offensive in general.

Whether this book, which is a notable contribution to the history of air warfare, redresses the balance in his favour is a matter of opinion, though it undoubtedly dispels many of the myths surrounding Bomber Command. The bombing campaign remains a controversial issue which seems likely to endure far into the future. Robin Neillands, quoting Macaulay's view that moderation in war is imbecility rightly insists that in short there must also be morality in war. To suppose otherwise is to condone barbarism.

COPYRIGHT 2001 Contemporary Review Company Ltd.
COPYRIGHT 2001 Gale Group