Washington and the 'great game' in central Asia

Contemporary Review, May, 2002 by Alec Rasizade

Russia's policy-making elite is divided over how to respond to the geopolitical shift that has occurred in Central Asia. The sudden arrival of US forces in Central Asia has prompted some analysts in Moscow to accuse the government of 'losing' Central Asia. Hawkish statements are coming from such leading figures as the State Duma speaker G. Seleznyov, who said during his recent tour of the region: 'Russia will not endorse the emergence of permanent US military bases in Central Asia'.

In addition, Russian security officials claim there is a score of top secret Russian military facilities in Central Asia that the USA and NATO are keen to gather information on. In Kazakhstan, there is the Sary-Shagan anti-missile launching site and the radar station, which is part of Russia's early-warning system. In Kyrgyzstan, the Russian navy has a long-distance communications centre, and a testing site for the nuclear submarines' rockets on the lake Issyk-Kul. There is also a space surveillance station, located at Nurek in Tajikistan.

China also initially acquiesced in the US action in Afghanistan not least because of evidence that Al Qaeda was training Muslim separatists operating in the Xinjiang Autonomous Province of western China. Beijing has generally deferred to Russia in Central Asia on security issues, preferring instead to focus on expanding trade links across the region. China is now expressing concern that the new US military presence in Central Asia poses a threat to Beijing's political and economic interests in the region. In the Chinese opinion, the American basing rights in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are part of the broader strategy to contain the expansion of Chinese influence.

Chinese diplomats have alleged in particular that the US was seeking access to an air base near Semipalatinsk in Kazalthstan, the old site of Soviet nuclear tests. The base was designed by the USSR specifically to support possible strategic operations against China. Kazakhstan officials dispute the Chinese claims, saying that Washington has asked for access to military bases in southern Kazalthstan, but not in Semipalatinsk to the north. The bases under discussion were at Taraz and Chimkent. US officials have been tight-lipped on specifics. However, American diplomats in Kazakhstan, citing the on-going anti-terrorism campaign in the region, have spoken about a general need for US access to local military facilities.

The Sino-Russian response strategy was unveiled at a meeting in Beijing in January 2002. It consists of the transformation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), hitherto a forum for border demilitarization and trade promotion, into a regional security structure capable of conducting joint anti-terrorist operations. As all the Central Asian states (bar Turkmenistan) already belong to the SCO, this should be viewed as a direct attempt to reduce the rationale for a Western security presence in the region.

The Central Asian states are acutely aware that any security commitments they are able to extract from the USA or NATO would be greatly welcomed. China appraised this situation and sent its delegation to the Central Asian republics in January. The delegation announced in Tashkent a Chinese economic assistance to Uzbekistan to the amount of $600 million (compared to $160 million pledged by the USA). The visit to Tashkent was the main purpose of the delegation's trip, since the USA is rapidly increasing its military presence in this key country. Thus Islam Karimov has managed to attract the necessary assistance to destroy his internal enemies, and both the United States and China are ready to help him.