Washington and the 'great game' in central Asia

Contemporary Review, May, 2002 by Alec Rasizade

Finally, Washington may encourage expectations upon which it cannot deliver. Uzbekistan, for example, is a complex and volatile state. Tashkent persistently behaved in a heavy-handed way, refusing to pay for water from Kyrgyzstan and also violated the gas-for-water agreement. The Uzbeks are fond of reminding people that they are selling gas at about half price compared to the prevailing global prices and do not conceal their greater regional ambitions. If they become involved in an armed conflict with a Central Asian neighbour, what then would be the American role and how could it be fulfilled?

The 'Great Game' in Central Asia after Afghanistan

Some American foreign policy planners hold that after the destruction of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan the USA should leave the post-war stabilization and reconstruction to others. Such a course runs the danger of condemning all Central Asia to further waves of instability from Afghanistan. The longer-term implications of US troop deployments in Central Asia are still difficult to gauge. Central Asia has been transformed from a strategic backwater to the crucible of international diplomacy and, in this new geopolitical environment, Washington remains opaque about its ultimate intentions and exit strategy.

The United States is quickly building up its military capacity in Central Asia, and soon could be in a position to back tough words with actions. The US air force has established a presence at Afghan bases in Baghram and Kandahar, as well as at Hanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan. These facilities can help the US military quickly gain air superiority throughout Central Asia, and even into the Middle East.

Not only does this expanded and deepened US presence in Central Asia involve an intensification of the rivalry with Russia, China and Iran in the so-called new 'great game', but it could also easily lead to tensions among the Central Asian rulers who want to perpetuate their authoritarian regimes and gain outside support for themselves and their regional ambitions. There is no simple way to resolve all these tensions peacefully and amicably. It is hence unlikely that we can expect true stability in Central Asia anytime soon, even under conditions of American leadership. The cumulative effect of a long-term Western military presence in the region may be to engender deep insecurities in Russia and China while simultaneously placing security obligations on the West that it has little inclination or ability to discharge.

As a consequence, Russia's role as Central Asia's principal security manager is under threat. Moscow was happy to see the destruction of the Taliban, and President Putin has scored some important diplomatic gains in recent months in return for Russian cooperation, most notably a more understanding attitude in the West to Russian military operations in Chechnya. In the short run, these benefits are likely to outweigh objections, but if there is no timetable for the departure of American troops from Central Asia, Moscow is likely to perceive the US response to terrorism as little more than an excuse to extend American military presence into the region, which Russian strategists have portrayed since the end of the nineteenth century as the country's soft underbelly.