India's nuclear decision

Contemporary Review, Dec, 2002 by Sharif M. Shuja

FOR the most part, the evidence of the 1990s would seem to suggest that the stability and prosperity of Asia-Pacific have flowed in part from the widespread adherence by regional countries to the non-proliferation norms and regimes, the centrepiece of which is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT dates back to 1968 when seventy states signed the NPT, which came into force in 1970. Nuclear non-proliferation was generally considered a desirable objective by most of the states that signed the NPT. Many countries, however, kept their nuclear options open after signing the NPT. Iraq and North Korea are but two examples.

Many analysts and commentators assert, repeatedly, that nations signed the NPT because they believed that a world with fewer nuclear powers would have a lower likelihood of nuclear war. This is a simplistic view of the Treaty's history. Most nations signed the NPT because they had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, and therefore, would lose nothing by signing the treaty; because they believed their security would be enhanced if their neighbours also pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons; and because they were promised assistance and cooperation in civilian nuclear programmes if they signed the Treaty. Furthermore, it is difficult to prove, statistically, that fewer nuclear nations means a lower likelihood of use. Nuclear weapons have been used only in one conflict in 1949; at the time, only one nation possessed nuclear weapons.

Under the NPT's provisions, however, two classes of nations were created -- nations without nuclear weapons that agreed to forego them, and nations that possessed them and were permitted, for a time, to go on possessing them. Today, 188 nations have ratified the NPT as non-nuclear powers, in return for which they have been given access to certain technology for nuclear energy. With 188 parties, it has the widest membership of any arms control agreement in history. Algeria, after building up a large nuclear research facility with China's assistance, eventually joined the NPT in January 1995. South Africa never had a stock of nuclear weapons, while Argentina and Brazil only had research programmes.

Arms Control and Disarmament

We need to discuss now arms control and disarmament issues, and also define the differences between arms control, arms limitation, arms reduction, and non-proliferation.

In general, both arms control and disarmament deal with the same subject -- arms stability. These terms are frequently used interchangeably as linked, compatible and occasionally synonymous concepts. But differentiating these two terms is important. Arms control is a relative concept to limit certain types of weaponry or to reduce armament levels by stabilising relations among rival states in order to discourage an arms race or an attack. It is designed to subordinate arms reduction for the purpose of enhancing stability through agreements that reduce the threat. Thus arms control measures seek to constrain reciprocal threats without eliminating them. By contrast, disarmament actually reduces existing military capabilities. An arms race is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of war. Nations do not distrust each other just because they are armed. Often they are armed because they distrust each other. Disarmament is an absolute concept to destroy global-level-weaponry and to eliminate possibly all armed forces. It aims at the reduction of armament as a goal to avoid war.

Specifically, arms control exists within disarmament and means negotiated measures, either unilateral or bilateral agreements among nation-states in restricting arsenals of weapons instead of abolishing the weapons. In this aspect, arms control is compatible with traditional diplomacy. While disarmament implies absolute reduction of armed forces and demands a change to institutionalised peace, arms control refers to relative reduction of weapons to avoid an arms race and to maintain stability. The former needs the agreement of both parties. The latter can be implemented by one party.

Furthermore, arms control is divided into three types: arms reduction, arms limitation and arms freeze. Arms reduction is sometimes called partial disarmament and refers to a mutually agreed-upon decision to lower the arms level either on a world-wide or on a regional basis among the nation-states. Arms limitation attempts to limit the scope and destructiveness of warfare and to prevent its accidental outbreak in accordance with the conventional rules of international law. A mutual arms freeze does not change the arsenal much but reduces (or freezes) the growth so that rival nations can feel comfortable in their military parity. Neither side gives up anything under an arms freeze. Verification requirements are less stringent than under other types of arms control.

From a strategic standpoint, disarmament is based on the assumption that the existence of weapons is not a consequence but rather a fundamental cause of uncertainty and conflicts. According to this approach, by reducing or eliminating armaments on a global scale, peace could be achieved. Obviously, in a world where there is no authority to settle international disputes, disarmament gives way to a security dilemma. Any state that is left to its own resources perceives a real or would-be threat and is thus faced with the security dilemma. Then, lacking international guarantees, it will decide to keep its stockpile -- nuclear or conventional as it may be.