Post-conflict peace-making from Bosnia to Iraq: lessons which should be learnt

Contemporary Review, March, 2004 by Nicholas Bonsor

FROM 1992 to 1995 I served as Chairman of the Defence Select Committee of the House of Commons, and from 1995 until 1997 I was the Minister of State at the Foreign Office with the responsibility, among others, for Her Majesty's Government's Policy in the former Yugoslavia. For the whole period of the fighting in Bosnia, therefore, I was deeply involved in the conflict and a frequent visitor to that country and to its neighbours in former Yugoslavia. I met all the political leaders of the times, including President Milosevic, and in the latter part of 1996 and in early 1997 was also responsible for opening the negotiations with President Milosevic and Dr. Rugova concerning the future of Kosovo. Since leaving office I have kept in touch with military and political leaders with current responsibility for British policy both in those areas and in Afghanistan and Iraq. What follows is my personal view of the way in which the Balkan crisis developed; the triumphs and failures of the international community's efforts to bring peace to that region; and the lessons which should be learnt to avoid conflict re-erupting in former Yugoslavia and other regions in central and eastern Europe and the Middle East where tensions remain a threat to Western civilisation.

The Conflict in Bosnia

Although the conflict in Bosnia was fundamentally a battle between the three groups, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, living within that country, there was a great deal of outside involvement both by Croatia and Serbia. The tribal differences between the three adversaries were of extremely long standing and involved deep and lasting hatred.

However, it should not be forgotten that the reason why there were, at the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia, over 120,000 Serbs living in Krajina was that the Croatians had initially invited the Serbs to that region in order to protect the Croatian community against the invading Turks. This the Serbs successfully did, and the Muslin conquest of that area was effectively held back by the Serbs both in regard to their own territory and that of the Habsburg Empire. The communities did, therefore, manage to live peacefully as neighbours for a very long time and, given the right circumstances, could do so again.

The reason for international intervention was, initially, the sight of the suffering of the innocent civilians caught up in the conflict in those countries, particularly the women and children, which touched the hearts of both European and American people to the extent that their respective Governments felt obliged both to send humanitarian aid and to support that aid with the amount of military back-up necessary to ensure its safe distribution.

It became apparent, however, that the distribution of such aid was inadequate and the slaughter of all three populations would continue if the international community did not intervene very much more strongly. Thus, the military force which initially was involved only with the distribution of humanitarian aid, was transformed under the United Nations leadership to form UNPROFOR, a force which was designed not only to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, but also to prevent the wholesale slaughter of the population. The size of the forces involved grew steadily as a consequence.

After the Dayton Agreement in November 1995, the size of the forces on the ground was increased even further, from 32,000 to 55,000, with the mandate to use force wherever necessary to implement the Peace Agreement and ensure the cessation of hostilities by all parties.

Initially, the intentions of the West in intervening were muddled and unclear. Certainly, humanitarian aid was at the forefront of the reasons for doing so, but there was also the intention of preventing the Croats and the Serbs sending large forces into Bosnia and expanding the war to involve both Croatia and Serbia as major players in it. This initial objective was then expanded by the Carrington/Vance and then the Owen/Vance peace efforts, which attempted to restore Bosnia to the same ethnic mix as it had before the eruption of violence, and ended up with a proposal which would have left Bosnia looking rather like a currant bun. It would have had pockets of ethnic mix distributed throughout the country as it had been before the break-up of Yugoslavia.

By the time the Dayton Agreement was signed, there was a recognition that some kind of division, at least of political control, had to be accepted as the only way forward for providing peace, but the separation had to be along lines which were militarily defensible. Thus, Bosnia was divided into areas controlled separately by the Serbs, Croats and Muslims but under the umbrella of a Federal Joint Presidency and a Joint Representative Parliament.

At the Local Government level, however, this did not follow through as the voters were entitled to exercise their democratic rights in the areas in which they had lived before the war. This led to a bizarre situation in which people who could not safely return to areas, whether they were Croat, Muslim or Serb, were exercising their voting rights and putting into place representatives who could not safely return to those areas either.