American Marines are guided by an old manual in Iraq

Contemporary Review, April, 2005 by Paolo Tripodi

IT is just two years since the end of major combat operations in Iraq but this period has turned out to be the greatest challenge for the Coalition troops. 'This is a different kind of conflict. War fighting is just an element of it', stated retired US Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, a well-known critic of the war in Iraq. While in a broader perspective Robert Kaplan, a correspondent of the Atlantic Monthly, noted that: 'Like Desert Storm, in 1991, Operation Iraqi Freedom had been a relatively painless dazzling success only because it was incomplete. In both cases victory was declared before a critical part of the operation had even been attempted'. Currently, the greatest issue in Iraq is dealing with a new concept of victory and what it entails. Defeating conventional enemy forces is just the initial step of a military action, but 'victory' in this type of environment is determined by the ability of coalition troops to create the necessary conditions to prevent the country from falling into a state of anarchy, and ultimately becoming fertile ground for a strong insurgent movement.

In the months that followed the fall of Baghdad on 9 April, 2003, Coalition troops have lost partial or full control over some key areas of the country. They have had to deal with a resilient and rapidly growing insurgency. This new enemy has adopted tactics that are far from conventional. Improvised devices, kidnapping, beheading, intimidation, and any tool that can slow down the process of stabilization has been used with horrific consequences. Since May 2003 hundreds of soldiers have been killed, indeed, last month US casualties alone reached 1,500 killed. It is impossible to make a reasonable prediction of how long coalition troops will have to remain in Iraq. The election in January was considered a key and successful political event that, one hopes, will make an impact on the resistance especially if the Iraqi government manages to achieve some stability. Yet this is something that can only be assessed over a long period.

The conflict in Iraq underscores a phenomenon that has been a constant feature since the early 1990s: stabilization and security operations require an approach that is significantly different from the one used to prevail against a conventional enemy. Troops deployed in a complex emergency must have the skill to switch from a warfighting mindset to one that focuses also on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. They have to be able to create some sort of working relationship with the local population and with political authorities that can be trusted. In order to achieve these objectives two main things are of vital importance. First, a significant amount of troops should possess the skills required to provide an acceptable degree of security and to restore, as quickly as possible, normal life conditions. In practical terms they must prevent looting, re-activate hospitals, and bring local leaders together. The type of troops that should be deployed on this 'front line' are: military police; military doctors and civil affairs officers, to mention just a few.

Second the same troops that just yesterday have done much of the shooting and killing now have to use force in a very careful way. Ideally these troops should be used as a tactical/security reserve.

Both components must be particularly effective because they have an extremely narrow window of opportunity to make a difference in a post-conflict situation. They have to communicate to the local population that they are there for a limited period of time to create a safe and secure environment, help with development and provide as much as possible of whatever is necessary to improve the quality of life of the local people. As we learned in Iraq, as well as in Somalia and in many other unstable places in the world, it takes very little to lose the support of local people. This is particularly true where there is already a high level of hostility against the troops. The bottom line is that being successful in 'winning hearts and minds' reduces significantly the ability of the resistance to be effective.

In the post-conflict situation in Iraq, Coalition troops faced a complex environment in which different tasks and several threats had to be dealt with simultaneously. For this reason troops had to posses a high level of flexibility, adaptability and mental agility. Many cities had become a difficult, but very important terrain where it was vital to initiate appropriate actions. In this setting civilians have military significance. The more hostile the environment, the more significant is the role played by the local population. Clearly humanitarian assistance should have been the main concern of the Coalition. Failure in the relief efforts heightened the hostile sentiments of the population, which in turn had military consequences. Civilians joined the insurgent movement or provided support for it. In both cases the outcome was disastrous.

Clearly, all relief efforts in Iraqi cities had to take this fact into account. Indeed, although it was expected that a large part of the population would become friendly, it was necessary to plan for the possibility that a segment would try to damage the effort and drag Coalition troops into a full-scale urban warfare. To achieve their aims, insurgents attacked Coalition troops trying to provoke an overreaction from them. They wanted the local population to believe that civilians were targeted by Coalition troops, as they would enjoy gains if they could present Coalition troops, not only as occupiers, but also as 'killers'.