Henry Kissinger and U.S. foreign policy

Contemporary Review, July, 2005 by Ian Jackson

The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. Jussi Hanhimaki. Oxford University Press [pounds sterling]21.50 (US$35.00). xxii 554 pages. ISBN 0-19-517221-3.

Despite leaving office almost three decades ago, Henry Kissinger has remained a controversial figure in American foreign policy. Even today, in his early eighties, Dr Kissinger continues informally to advise presidents and world leaders, produce thought-provoking articles and books on contemporary world affairs and comment regularly on international issues in the American media. With the declassification of thousands of U.S. government documents and transcripts of telephone conversations in the last five years, historians have begun to reassess Henry Kissinger's contribution to U.S. foreign policy during a time when the nation suffered its most serious constitutional crisis since the Civil War. The new research has confirmed Dr Kissinger's dominance over foreign policy-making in the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Revered by some and ridiculed by others, Henry Kissinger's legacy remains uncertain. Admirers of the former secretary of state argue that he transformed world politics in the 1970s through the policies of detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC). On the other hand, detractors charge that he violated international law and had little regard for the wide-scale suffering his policies engendered among millions of people in the Third World.

Jussi Hanhimaki, in the first major re-evaluation of Henry Kissinger in over a decade, provides a balanced and lucid analysis of U.S. foreign policy during a pivotal phase of the Cold War. Mr Hanhimaki's new study of the former Secretary of State is panoramic in scope, exhaustively researched and cogently argued. The reader is, thus, treated to a truly global account of U.S. foreign policy set in the context of Henry Kissinger's personal worldview, his relationship with two American presidents and his diplomatic approach and style. Jussi Hanhimaki begins the book with a brief intellectual biography of his subject, which usefully describes the impact of Dr Kissinger's scholarly perceptions of international relations as a professor at Harvard University. The intellectual mindset that Henry Kissinger developed during the course of two decades of studying nuclear weapons and the concept of the balance-of-power appears to have strongly influenced his 'triangular diplomacy', which he instituted in his policy towards the Soviet Union and China. From the outset, then. Henry Kissinger wanted to redefine American foreign policy. He acknowledged that both the Vietnam War, nuclear parity with Moscow and U.S. economic decline were obstacles that needed to be surmounted in order to ensure that the United States remained an influential world power and that its national interests continued to be served.

In a series of tightly woven chapters, Jussi Hanhimaki proves an authoritative guide to Dr Kissinger's policies towards an array of regions and countries. A major focus of the book is its subject's obsession with building a multipolar balance-of-power among the United States, China and the Soviet Union. First as Richard Nixon's national security advisor and then as Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger tirelessly worked to build a bridge to peace with China and to reduce the threat of nuclear war between the superpowers through arms controls negotiations with the Soviets. The author concludes that Dr Kissinger's preoccupation with triangular diplomacy and linkage harmed U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. According to Jussi Hanhimaki, his subject's 'amoral' realism resulted in some of the worst excesses in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era. It is these policies, in particular, that have tarnished Henry Kissinger's reputation and led to some commentators branding the former Secretary of State a war criminal.

Jussi Hanhimaki, however, does not believe that Dr Kissinger is a war criminal. He asserts that the former Secretary of State was a realistic practitioner of diplomacy and conflict resolution who, despite some triumphs, pursued misguided polices that failed to stand the test of time and only succeeded in dividing the American foreign policy establishment. The author suggests that Dr Kissinger's culpability lies with his myopic view of the Soviet Union as an enduring influence in world politics. Within fifteen years of Henry Kissinger's departure from office, the Cold War would be consigned to history and the Soviet Union would cease to exist. Undoubtedly, this book will not be the last word on Dr Kissinger. As historians gain access to new material from government archives outside the United States, the effect of his policies on other countries will be revealed more fully. Jussi Hanhimaki, however, has taken the first step towards a more rounded and objective appraisal of an important statesman.