Cyprus at the crossroads

Contemporary Review, Jan, 1998 by Oliver Richmond

For the first time since the fighting of 1974, international interest in the wider environment of the Eastern Mediterranean may force an uncomfortable decision to accept a compromise upon the Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and Greek sides. Indeed, given the internal instability that Turkey is currently suffering from, and the return of the hawk, Ecevit, to political prominence (Ecevit was Prime Minister in 1974 and ordered Turkish troops into Cyprus), it is significant that Greece and Turkey have recently signed a non-aggression pact much to the approval of the international community, although tensions between the two countries continue to rise.

The change in the environment that has occurred recently can be mainly attributed to the tactics of the Greek Cypriot side, at and away from, the negotiating table. Having been forced to accept a bicommunal, bizonal and federal scenario in the mid-1970s, after it had become a de facto reality in 1974, the Greek Cypriot side provided the Turkish Cypriot community with most of its international credibility and provided the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, with much of his internal credibility by agreeing to negotiate under the auspices of the UN on these new terms. However, many Greek Cypriots feel that the UN framework does not reflect a just solution but believe that it is indicative of Turkish pressure on the international community rather than international principles, law, and norms. Thus, Greek Cypriot negotiating tactics have been balanced between the need to pander to international opinion, which supports the bicommunal, bizonal framework, and local opinion which tends to support a return to the pre-1974 positions on the part of the nationalists, or simply a continuation of the status quo. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot side argues that federation should presage future reunification while the Turkish Cypriot leadership see it as legitimising the partition of Cyprus into two more or less separate states. Those who support the UN framework to the letter in both communities are few and far between.

The Turkish Cypriot community has exploited this division by arguing it needs more guarantees under the UN framework rather than less, because of the lack of Greek Cypriot commitment. Turkish Cypriot policy since 1974 has been balanced between a reluctance to return what was gained by the use of force in 1974, and to relinquish their dream of a confederation or separate state, (or on the part of the extreme nationalists, partition and assimilation into Turkey), and direction from Turkey to relieve her of untoward international pressure by negotiating with the Greek Cypriot side. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has also been of the opinion that the longer the post-1974 status quo can be sustained, the more chance they have of recognition as a state in their own right, and it was this that their 1983 unilateral declaration of independence was aimed at. Thus, until 1996, it can be seen that the protracted stalemate was viewed as advantageous to both sides in the absence of the satisfaction of their nationalist objectives. The Greek Cypriot side felt that time would enable them to bring international pressure to bear on Turkey thus altering the geopolitical realities of the region: the Turkish Cypriot side felt that it justified their thesis that the two sides could not live together and made it more likely that they would receive international recognition. But in 1996, the situation was altered irrevocably.

A serious escalation of tensions in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey took place early in 1996. Greece was caught unawares and after US intervention, Greece immediately speeded up its military procurements and modernisation programme. After serious intercommunal rioting in Cyprus in August 1996, military co-operation between Greece and Cyprus continued to gather pace, with the construction of Greek air and naval bases in Cyprus, and then the procurement by the Cypriot government of high-tech Russian missile systems. Allied to these developments was the alliance between Ciller and the Islamist, Erbakan, the latter who became modern Turkey's first Islamic Prime Minister. This almost immediately sparked conflict between those in Turkey who favoured moves towards the West (including the powerful Turkish military), and those who favoured moves towards the East. Finally, with the fruition of the Republic of Cyprus's application for accession to the EU, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side seemed for the first time since 1974 to have lost control of the situation. As a result, the major players of the international community were alerted to the fragile situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and began to intervene to revive UN efforts to solve the problems of Cyprus, dormant since 1994 because of the 'absence of any common ground between the Cypriot sides.

This situation escalated with Turkey's threat to attack any missile installations on Cyprus. The international community condemned the Greek Cypriot missile purchase, but the Greek Cypriot side argue that as sovereign state, this is clearly within their rights. Russia too, has backed the Greek Cypriot side, much to the concern of Turkey. However, the US has put pressure on the Greek Cypriot leadership to postpone the missiles' delivery, currently scheduled for this spring. The Greek Cypriot side has unashamedly used the missile issue in order to put pressure on the Turkish Cypriot side to agree to an early solution; Turkey and Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, have responded with typical bellicosity.