The teaching of empathy for high school and college students: testing Rogerian methods with the interpersonal reactivity index

Adolescence, Winter, 1994 by Sherry L. Hatcher, Missi S. Nadeau, Lisa K. Walsh, Meredith Reynolds, Jerry Galea, Kaye Marz

Whether empathy can be "taught" has long been debated. Can we teach an individual to feel for another person, to "walk in someone else's shoes?" (Myrick & Erney, 1985). Such a question is often one of the first posed by students who are learning the art of counseling, and it is an issue consistently debated in faculty discussions on the training of graduate students in mental health professions.

Not only is an ability to emphathize with others essential for counseling professionals, but empathic individuals fare better in a variety of interpersonal relationships, whether professional, familial, or friendship (Guzzetta, 1976). The ego strength embodied in the capacity for empathy serves as a foundation for relationships and also provides a basis for coping with stress and resolving conflict (Kremer & Dietzen, 1991). For this reason, empathy is on most psychologists' short list of crucial ego strengths and is valued along with reality testing, intelligence, and creativity, for its preventive potential in preserving emotional health (Greenson, 1960; Kohut, 1959).

Despite much uniformity of opinion regarding the significance of empathy, there is much controversy as to the mechanisms by which a capacity for empathy develops and whether it can be taught (Carkuff & Berenson, 1967; Davis, 1980; Hogan, 1969; Layton, 1979; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). It is also important to note that the definitions of this concept in the literature have been confusing and contradictory. Schafer (1959), Rogers (1957), and Greenson (1960) share a similar conceptualization of empathy as "the inner experience of sharing in and comprehending the momentary psychological state of another person" (Schafer, 1959). Other writers note the cognitive components of this construct; i.e., an ability to "understand" the situation of another (Hogan, 1969). Still others focus primarily on the affective aspect of empathy, as an ability to "feel" for the situation of others (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). Only a small number of studies have addressed the relative contribution of each in systematic fashion (Davis, 1980).

Cooper's (1970) review of the literature on empathy suggested a developmental model, relating empathy to other affective and cognitive skills which evolve over the course of the life span. This approach is similar to that proposed by Hatcher, R., Hatcher, S. Berlin, Okla, and Richards (1990) in which the intrapsychic functions of empathy, self-understanding, and psychological mindedness were discussed as developing in parallel fashion to cognition (Piaget, 1932) and moral maturity (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971). Such theories suggest that there is a natural potential for empathy which may be elicited by the environment. Similarly, Emde (1989) suggests that a capacity for empathy ripens over time. He notes that the most mature form, which he calls "developmental empathy," requires the cognitive component of "perspective taking" in addition to the earlier unconscious and affective antecedents of empathy. These latter antecedents more closely resemble sympathy; i.e., a strong identification with another person in which the child's egocentric point of view does not allow for clear differentiation between the self and the other. Barrett-Lennard (1981) makes an important distinction between "observational empathy" which is an internal experience not requiring the presence of another person and "helping relationship" empathy which requires interpersonal communication.

Davis, who defines empathy as a "reaction to the observed experiences of another" (1983, p. 113) builds on a multidimensional conception of empathy in the construction of his Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). His scales for affective and cognitive measures respect the developmental conception of empathy while differentiating the earliest affective component of the concept "Personal Distress" (Davis, 1980) from the more mature and affective cognitive versions such as "Perspective Taking" and "Empathic Concern" (Davis, 1983; Emde, 1989). A 1991 study by Davis and Franzoi demonstrated that the IRI's Perspective Taking Scale which "reflect(s) an ability or proclivity to shift perspectives--to step 'outside the self'--when dealing with other people" (Davis, 1980, p. 9), was positively correlated with the exclusively cognitive Hogan Empathy Scale (1969) while the IRI's Personal Distress Scale, which measures "the individual's own fear, feelings of apprehension and discomfort at witnessing the negative experiences of others" (Davis, 1980, p. 4) correlated negatively with the Hogan measures. Of Davis's four scales, the Perspective Taking Scale, which is consistently related to measures of "interpersonal functioning" (Davis, 1983), was the least correlated with Mehrabian and Epstein's Emotional Empathy Scale (MEEES), (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), while the IRI's strongest measure of "emotional empathy" (Empathic Concern) correlated most strongly with the MEEES (Davis, 1983).

Davis's 1983 findings also imply a developmental progression for the IRI test, in that the Personal Distress Scale was negatively correlated with the more advanced Perspective Taking and Empathic Concern subscales. Such a finding is consistent with the theoretical literature on this point which suggests that empathy follows a developmental path not unlike that of cognitive and moral development (Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Hatcher et al., 1990; Hoffman, 1977). In 1977 Hoffman proposed a developmental progression for the concept of empathy in which he theorized that a child progresses from a "self-oriented" personal distress reaction to an "other-oriented" perspective-taking mode. Hoffman reasoned that such an advance occurs as the child matures and is increasingly able to differentiate him/herself from others in a less narcissistic fashion.