Burakumin at the end of history - history of social class in Japan

Social Research, Spring, 2003 by Ian Neary

How does Hatanaka define burakumin? Following Inoue Kiyoshi, he suggests that occupation, place of residence, and lineage were the defining features of kawata (1950: 6). Occupation no longer explains very much and even in the early modern period relatively few kawata could make a living from the leather trade; most made some or all of their livelihood from farming. Lineage explains little because it does not tell us how or why different societies treat these groups as outsiders. Simple facts about residence do not tell us very much anymore either. We know that--although the pattern varies greatly--in the early 1990s on average only 41.4 percent of those living in areas defined by the local government as buraku were linear descendants of prewar burakumin, let alone pre-twentieth-century kawata, with the range going from 2.7 percent to 97.7 percent (Somucho, 1995: 3). Moreover, some suggest that if a burakumin is anyone who had one grandparent who was a burakumin, the population could be as high as 10 million (Hatanaka, 1998: 75). Perhaps simple awareness of buraku identity is sufficient: I am a burakumin if I and others think I am. This affects my perception of myself and my social relations because there are obstacles to my activities that are outside my control and prevent me exercising free choice in the job and marriage markets. Burakumin, of course, are not the only individuals to face discrimination or such difficulties. The challenge for society is to create an environment in which barriers are eliminated and differences can be overcome. However, while it is reasonably clear what these difficulties are in the case of women or the disabled, it is not obvious what the differences are between burakumin and mainstream Japanese that have to be transcended or what (more) society or state can do. This approach argues that although we cannot choose our parents or birthplace, we can choose not to be fettered by them; and while not hiding the possibility that we might be labeled burakumin, we could positively reject it: I am not a burakumin if I say I am not. I might even recognize that my father was a burakumin but claim that I am not. Indeed, Hatanaka suggests we need to encourage such "positive rejection" (Hatanaka, 1998: 87-94).

Hatanaka is especially critical of a policy adopted by a small private university that created a special entry system for applicants from minority groups: burakumin, Koreans resident in Japan, Ainu, Okinawans. He objects to this, at least for burakumin, since it requires third-party certification of a social status that has no objective existence outside the particular social situation. One condition of solving the buraku problem, he argues, would be for buraku identity to become meaningless. His objection to such special entry schemes, however well intended, is that they make visible something that is becoming less so (Hatanaka, 1998: 76-82).

Consistent with these ideas and directly opposed to the BLL's political origin theory is the national reconciliation theory, which has three basic premises: