The Time of Kali: Violence between Religious Groups in India

Social Research, Fall, 2000 by Sudhir Kakar

   The clashes between Hindus and Muslims started long ago in the period of
   the Nizam and his razakars (a marauding, unofficial army) who were very
   cruel to the Hindus. They used to harass our girls, rape them. This
   happened not only in villages but even in Hyderabad. We feared the Muslims.
   The rule was theirs, the king was theirs, the police was theirs, so it was
   hard for the Hindus to resist. We were also poor and no one supports the
   poor. Some marwadis may have been well-off but the majority of Hindus was
   poor. The Muslims were close to the king. They were moneylenders, charging
   high rates of interest. Thus they were rich and the Hindus poor and though
   we lived together Muslims dominated the Hindus. (Kakar, 1996, 134)

It is instructive to note that in popular accounts of the conflict, the economic, secular and nationalist historical explanations are not exclusive but blended into a single narrative. Unlike the historians, the people involved in the conflict operate with two histories of Hindu-Muslim relations. In times of heightened conflict between the two communities, the Hindu nationalist history that supports the version of age-old animosity between the two assumes preeminence and organizes cultural memory in one particular direction. In times of relative peace, the focus shifts back to the secular history emphasizing commonalities and shared pieces of the past. Many of the cultural memories that were appropriate during the conflict will retreat, fade, or take on new meaning, while others that incorporate the peaceful coexistence of Hindus and Muslims will resurface.

The social-psychological context of the conflict was especially evident in the case of Muslims who were more prone to view themselves as helpless victims of changed historical circumstances and the demands of the modern world. They conveyed an impression of following a purposeless course, buffeted by the impact of others in a kind of social Brownian motion. Some Muslim women even took a melancholy satisfaction from this turn of the historical wheel that had reversed the position of subjects and rulers, and of the accustomed directions of inequality and injustice. The loss of a collective self-idealization was especially evident in the case of the elite among the Muslims, who explicitly mourned the loss of Muslim power and glory in the abrupt ending of the Nizam's rule. This elite had a fractured self-esteem in the wake of historical change that saw an end to their political role and a virtual disappearance of their language. Poor Muslims also had an inchoate sense of oppression and the looming shadow of a menacing, hopeless future; for both groups, there were enough fundamentalist preachers offering a cure. The bad condition of the Muslims is not due to historical changes but to a glaring internal fault: the weakening or loss of religious faith. One Mullah says;

   No wonder that Islam is bending under the assault of kufr (unbelief); Arabs
   are bowing before Jews and Christians, you before the Hindus. What is this
   preoccupation with worldly wealth and success? Allah says, I did not bring
   you into the world to make two shops out of one, four out of two, two
   factories out of one, four out of two. Does the Qur'an want you to do that?
   Does the Prophet? No! They want you to dedicate yourself to the faith, give
   your life for the glory of Islam. (Kakar, 1996, 223-224)