Puzzles of women's rights in Brazil

Mala Htun

BRAZIL has the dubious distinction of being the Latin American country with the lowest level of women's representation in national politics. Yet Brazil has Latin America's largest, most vibrant, and most diverse feminist movement, and has pioneered policy changes advancing women's rights. Brazilian women's capabilities and opportunities--in terms of life expectancy, literacy, and labor force participation--have steadily increased. If Brazilian women are advancing in other areas, why not in politics? In this article, I explore the seeming discrepancy between women's gains in Brazilian society and their extreme under-representation in political office. I argue that institutional features--the weakness of Brazil's women's quota law, electoral rules, and clientelistic, unprogrammatic parties--go a long way toward explaining the difficulties faced by aspiring Brazilian women politicians. I also consider the question--given that Brazil is adopting public policies to advance women's rights--of whether women's political under-representation is really a serious problem.

Women's Minor Presence in Power

Compared with the rest of Latin America, women's representation in Brazilian politics is lamentably low. In 2002, women comprised a mere 6 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and 7 percent of the Senate, compared with a Latin American average of 15 and 12 percent, respectively. In 2000, no woman served in Brazil's cabinet, while the Latin American average was 13 percent. To be sure, some women occupy important positions, such as Benedita da Silva, the governor of Rio de Janeiro; Roseana Sarney, governor of Maranhao and former presidential candidate; Marta Suplicy, mayor of Sao Paulo; Katia Born, mayor of Maceio; Luiza Erundina, also a former Sao Paulo mayor and current federal deputy; and Rita Camata, federal deputy and vice presidential candidate on the Brazilian Social Democracy Party -Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PSDB-PMDB) ticket. These women are exceptions, however, because the numbers demonstrate that Brazil lags behind both Latin American and world averages, at

least at the national level (see table 1).

Women are slightly more numerous among senior public servants in Brazil, but their representation at the top is still massively disproportional to women's overall participation. Data from 1998 show that women comprised 44 percent of all federal government employees in Brazil, yet made up a mere 13 percent of employees of the highest rank (18 out of a total of 136), and 16 percent of the second highest rank (90 out of a total of 546) (Avelar, 2001: 99-101). Women are also scarce in the top tiers of the Brazilian diplomatic service: in 2000, 6 women were at the top rank, and 18 at the second-highest rank (103). In 2000, a woman was appointed to the Supreme Court for the first time in Brazilian history, even though 29 percent of candidates who pass public examinations to become judges are women (Veja, November 8, 2000).

Brazil's low numbers are striking when seen in comparison with some other Latin American countries, whose levels of women's representation are among the highest in the world. In Argentina and Costa Rica, where quota laws have been enormously successful, women make up 31 and 35 percent of Congress, respectively. In Argentina, women also comprise 36 percent of the Senate. Women are 21 percent of Congress in Nicaragua, 18 percent in Peru, and 16 percent in the Dominican Republic and Mexico. The record of Latin American presidents in appointing women to their cabinets is impressive. Soon after his election in 2002, Columbian President Alvaro Uribe appointed 6 women to serve in his cabinet, out of a total of 14 posts (43 percent). In 2000, women made up one-fourth of the cabinets of Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Venezuela. By contrast, during his entire presidency, Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) appointed only two women to serve in cabinet positions; the second, appointed during his last year in office, served for only a very short time.

Meanwhile, Advances in Women's Rights

In the 1980s and 1990s, women's status in Brazilian society advanced. World Bank data show that women's life expectancy increased from 66 years in 1980 to 71 years in 1999, fertility dropped from 3.9 children per woman in 1980 to 2.3 in 1999, and illiteracy decreased from 27 to 15 percent of women aged 15 and up. (1) At the same time, there has been considerable growth in women's participation in the labor force. Women were 29 percent of the labor force in 1976, 36 percent in 1985, and 41 percent in 1998 (Bruschini, n.d.). Women outnumber men in school enrollments at all levels, and women's income is increasing at a faster rate than men's. Between 1993 and 1999, women's average income increased by 43 percent, while men's increased by 19 percent (Veja, November 8, 2000). The wage gap between men and women persists, although it is narrowing. In 1992, women earned 62 percent of men's salaries; by 1999, this had climbed to 69 percent (Femea, April 2002).

Brazil has had, arguably, Latin America's earliest and largest second-wave feminist movement. From small groups of women who met in Brazil's largest cities to discuss sexuality, feminist theory, and gender oppression, the movement grew to develop a large middle-class base and extensive connections to popular women's movements in the 1980s (Alvarez, 1990). In the 1990s, the feminist movement created several national and international networks to advocate for women's rights. The Articulacao das Mulheres Brasileiras (Brazilian Women's Articulation), for example, was created to organize the feminist movement's preparation and follow up to the 1995 Beijing Women's Conference. The Articulacao links women's organizations in Brazil's 26 states and federal district. The Feminist Center for Studies and Advising (CFEMEA), the feminist lobby located in the capital city of Brasilia (see www.cfemea.org.br), provides advice to women in Congress, circulates an excellent monthly newsletter, tracks the progress of all women's rights legislation, conducts research projects, and organizes meetings and exchanges involving women's groups from all over the country. Other Brazilian feminist NGOs have, among other activities, worked to educate women on their legal rights, have provided family planning and sex education services, and have trained police officers and judges to better handle cases of violence against women.

Brazilian feminists have also worked with state officials to pioneer some of Latin America's most advanced legislation and innovative mechanisms to advance women's rights. Soon after the return to democracy, women in the National Council for Women's Rights (CNDM) organized to include progressive changes in the reform of the Brazilian constitution. (2) The CNDM organized seminars and public forums throughout Brazil, where lawyers, feminists, legislators, and the general public analyzed women's legal situation and formulated proposals for the constitution (CNDM, 1986). The CNDM staged demonstrations around the country, held a sit-in at the Congress in Brasilia, and offered support to the 26 female legislators into what became known as the "Lipstick Lobby" (a bancada do batom) in order to press feminist demands. According to the CNDM's former president, 80 percent of the women's movement's proposals were included in the final constitutional text (Pitanguy, 1996: 70) (see table 2).

The first women's police stations in the world were created in the early 1980s in the state of Sao Paulo. Since then, women's police stations have been established in the rest of Brazil and other countries of Latin America. By 2000, there were over 250 women's police stations in the country. Created to facilitate the reporting, investigation, and prosecution of cases of domestic violence and rape, these stations are largely staffed by women police officers who have been specially trained. Earlier, police had rarely investigated incidents of violence against women and treated victims with indifference (Nelson, 1996; Thomas, 1991). This changed with creation of the women's police stations, which have also led Brazilians to recognize domestic violence as criminal behavior constituting a violation of human rights. Brazilians are now less likely to see domestic violence as a matter of family privacy (Linhares Barsted, 1994).

Brazilian feminists have organized a legal abortion movement intended to see that women victims of violence have access to abortion. Although the Brazilian criminal code does not punish abortions performed on women who have been raped, no administrative procedures had existed to allow women who relied on the public health system to have access to abortions under these circumstances. Responding to feminist pressure, the state legislature of Rio de Janeiro approved a law in 1985 requiring public hospitals to perform legal abortions. The law was subsequently vetoed by the governor at the request of Rio's archbishop, Dom Eugenio Salles, but the city council of Rio de Janeiro adopted a similar municipal ordinance the same year (Linhares Barsted, 1993). Then, in 1989, the Silo Paulo city government under Workers' Party Mayor Luiza Erundina created a service for legal abortions at the Jabaquara Hospital. (The service was later established at other hospitals around the city.) At Jabaquara, a commission composed of doctors and social workers was appointed to receive petitions from women seeking abortions. On the basis of supporting documentation (a police report and medical exam verifying a rape, for example) and the period of gestation, the commission would authorize or deny the abortion. Explicit police authorization was not required. As of late 1999, 16 public hospitals in Brazil had introduced legal abortion services, and several municipalities had approved laws authorizing such services (Femea, August 1999).

To promote further advances in women's rights, women legislators in Brazil's Congress have organized a bancada feminina, or women's caucus. The bancada holds regular meetings, has established a committee to coordinate its work, and publishes a newsletter. The bancada feminina, together with CFEMEA, the feminist lobby group, has secured the approval of numerous laws advancing women's rights. (3)

* 2002: law authorizing judges to issue restraining orders against perpetrators or suspected perpetrators of domestic violence.

* 2002: law granting adoptive mothers the right to maternity leave and benefits.

* 2001: law criminalizing sexual harassment.

* 2001: law requiring that health insurance cover reconstructive plastic surgery for women suffering from breast cancer.

* 2001: approval of the new civil code that grants men and women equality in marriage and considers children equal regardless of whether they were born in or out of wedlock. In contrast to the old code, the new code has eliminated the archaic term "paternal power" (patrio poder) as well as rules enabling husbands to annul marriages on the grounds that the wife was not a virgin and that gave permission for parents to abandon daughters with "dishonest" behavior.

* 2001: law creating a framework for the adoption of sexual education and drug abuse courses by primary and secondary schools. This law was later vetoed by the president on the grounds that it interfered with pedagogical autonomy foreseen in other laws and that the Ministry of Education already recommended similar courses in its curricular guidelines.

* 2000: the Chamber of Deputies established a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI) to investigate Brazil's high levels of maternal mortality.

* 1999: law giving domestic workers the right to unemployment insurance. This law was vetoed by the president and replaced by a provisionary measure (medida provisoria) that was broadly similar, although applicable only to employees whose employers contributed to the national employment fund.

* 1999: law designed to create incentives for companies to hire more women workers.

It is possible, indeed likely, that more changes would have been seen if there had been more women in elected office. Nonetheless, women's minor presence in power has not served as an insurmountable obstacle to Brazil's adoption of policy changes benefiting women. This raises two questions. Why is women's political representation in Brazil so low? Does it matter, given that Brazil continues to adopt policies advancing women's rights and that women's status has improved?

Reasons for Women's Low Presence in Power

Brazil's low level of women's political representation is surprising given that the country approved a women's quota law in 1996. The law is phrased in gender-neutral terms, stating that parties must reserve a minimum of 30 percent and a maximum of 70 percent of slots for candidates of one sex. The quota percentage has increased with each election: it started at 20 percent in 1996, was raised to 25 percent in 1998, and then to 30 percent in 2000. By 2002 the law had been used three times, twice in municipal elections (1996 and 2000) and once in national elections (1998) (state legislators are elected in national election years). The results of the law have largely been disappointing at the national level, less so at the local and state levels. In 1994 (before the quota), women were 8 percent of state legislators (82 total) and 6 percent of federal deputies (32 total). After the quota, in 1998, women were 10 percent of state legislators (106 total), but still only 6 percent of federal deputies (29 total). In fact, the number of women in Congress actually decreased with the quota. At the local level, women fared better: women were 8 percent of city councilors in 1992 (before the quota). This increased with the quota to 11 percent in 1996 and 12 percent in 2000 (Malheiros Miguel, 2000; Martins Costa, 1997). Averaging across all Latin American countries with quotas, women's presence in national legislatures increased by an average of 8 percentage points due to the quota, and as much as 24 and 33 points in Argentina (in the Chamber and Senate, respectively) and 21 points in Costa Rica (Htun and Jones, 2002; Htun, forthcoming).

The mediocre results of quotas in Brazil can be partially attributed to the details of the law, which requires parties to reserve 30 percent of candidate slots for women, but does not demand that parties actually fill these slots. (4) Since Brazilian electoral law allows parties to postulate 50 percent more candidates than seats being contested in a state, a party can in practice propose a full slate without including any women. For example, if a state elects 10 members to congress, each party is permitted to postulate 15 candidates. The quota law requires that parties reserve four of these slots for women. If a party is unwilling to recruit women, it may thus propose 11 male candidates to the electorate and still not violate the law.

This loophole in the quota law helps explain why the number of women candidates has remained low. In 1994, before the law, the percentage of candidates for federal deputy who were women was 6 percent. In 1998, with the quota law, this had climbed to 10 percent. Numbers were higher at the state and local levels. Women made up 7 percent of candidates for state legislator in 1994, and 13 percent in 1998 (Malheiros Miguel, 2000: 95, 131). In elections for municipal councils, women were 18 percent of candidates in 1996 and 20 percent in 2000 (Araujo, 2002: 152). Clearly, women's low presence in power reflects, in part, the scarcity of women candidates, although the situation at the local level is improving. Yet Brazil's electoral rules and catchall, undisciplined parties may also be prejudicial to women's electoral prospects.

Brazil elects members of its Chamber of Deputies through a system of open-list proportional representation. Votes are pooled at the party level, but seats are distributed among candidates from each party according to the number of preference votes they receive (that is, voters generally cast votes for an individual candidate, not for a party list). The system generates competition among candidates of the same party for preference votes, and in this intraparty competition, women generally lose out (Htun and Jones, 2002). Moreover, the open-list system encourages personalistic, rather than party-oriented, behavior (Ames, 1995; Carey, 1997). Brazilian politics is dominated by masculine personality cults in which few women have risen to positions of importance.

Brazil's electoral rules differ from the closed-list systems of Argentina and Costa Rica, where party leaders control the order of candidates on the party list and thereby their chances of getting elected. In those two countries, placement mandates require the staggering of women and men on party lists. The combination of a closed-list system and placement mandate accounts for the quota laws' dramatic successes (Htun and Jones, 2002).

The nature of Brazilian parties may also hinder women's chances. Political scientists have hypothesized that women enjoy greater opportunities in rule-oriented, bureaucratic parties than in unstructured or clientelistic parties (Caul, 1999). When a party has institutionalized clear rules and procedures, potential candidates can better understand the nomination process and hold party leaders accountable to these rules. In Brazil, parties are weakly institutionalized, which may make rising to the top more difficult for women. With the exception of the Workers' Party (PT) and some small parties of the left, Brazilian parties lack stable roots in society, suffer from a high rate of split-ticket voting and low party identification among voters, and have very short organizational histories (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring, 1999: 26-39). Moreover, the vast majority of parties are "non-programmatic" in that they fail to maintain consistent, principled positions on national issues. Even when parties do adopt positions, party leaders are rarely willing or able to compel party representatives to uphold them (Mainwaring, 1999: 141). (5)

Skeptics might contend that women's low presence in power results not from institutional factors but a macho political culture. Yet there is evidence that Brazilian voters are actually quite willing to support women candidates. Public opinion surveys show that voters find women to be more honest than men. According to a poll conducted in September 2001 by CNT/Sensus, a majority of Brazilians believe that women in senior government posts are more honest, responsible, trustworthy, and competent than men (Femea, January 2002). These results are consistent with those of a poll of around 2,000 Latin Americans in five major cities conducted by Gallup on behalf of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Inter-American Dialogue in 2000 (Inter-American Dialogue, 2001a). In that study, 57 percent said that women's greater presence in political office would lead to better government. Over 90 percent claimed they would be willing to vote for a woman for president, and 69 percent believed that their country would elect a woman president over the next 20 years. Sixty-six percent agreed that women are more honest than men, and 85 percent agreed that women are good decision makers.

In recent Brazilian elections, party leaders have tried to capitalize on these favorable views of women candidates. For example, the Liberal Front Party (PFL) launched Maranhao Governor Roseana Sarney's "pre-candidacy" for the 2002 presidential elections in 2001 when early polls found that Sarney drew voters from all regions and social classes, and from both sexes. She was seen as more honest and trustworthy, and provided voters with a sense of security as well as an alternative to traditional, corrupt, male politicians. (6) The danger is that these stereotypes of women candidates create elevated expectations. When millions of reais (the Brazilian currency) were found in a business office owned by Sarney and her husband in March 2002, the candidate's credibility was shattered. In June 2002, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) selected Espirito Santo Deputy Rita Camata as the running mate for the government's presidential candidate, Jose Serra. Putting a woman on the ticket is important, the party felt, because Brazilian society expects to have a woman at the side of the ruler to provide a guarantee that he will not behave like a typical, macho, insensitive, and uncaring man. (7) Also in 2002, the Ciro Gomes Popular Socialist Party (PPS) presidential campaign placed the candidate's wife, former actress Patricia Pillar, in a prominent role, and her popularity was seen as one reason for Ciro's surge in the polls in July 2002. Meanwhile, the campaign of PT candidate Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva ("Lula") has attempted to maximize the presence of Sao Paulo Mayor Marta Suplicy (also from the PT) at events to counterbalance the perceived advantages that Patricia Pillar and Rita Camata are bringing to the Ciro and Serra campaigns, respectively. (8)

Does It Matter?

If Brazil is adopting policies to advance women's rights, and if women are making economic and social gains, why should we be concerned about the low levels of women's presence in power? Doesn't the pace of policy change make clear that women's interests are being represented, even if the actual numbers of women in office are low? Recent experience shows that in certain circumstances, male politicians, inspired by international norms and pressured by interest groups, can initiate policy changes to benefit women. The "Platform for Action" from the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, along with other agreements, help create norms of appropriate state behavior--norms that men feel compelled to conform to. Feminist interest groups and women politicians mobilized to make international norms salient in local politics and to pressure the state to change its policy. As a result, in the 1990s at least 16 Latin American countries adopted legislation to prevent and punish domestic violence, and 12 approved quota laws for women in power. Male politicians may also be compelled by the lure of women's votes. In Argentina in 1991, President Carlos Menem supported the women's quota law, in part, to close the gender gap between his Peronist Justicialist Party and the opposition Radical Party (Htun and Jones, 2002).

These examples show that men are able to serve as women's "representatives," especially when influenced by international norms and feminist interest groups. But is this all there is to representation? In one sense, representation can be construed as a principal-agent relationship in which the principal (the electorate) grants to the agent (the elected official) the authority to act and make binding decisions for the principal. A lawyer represents a person in court, a diplomat represents a country's positions at the United Nations. This is the type of representation needed for the "aggregative function" of decision making--when representatives need to ensure that all interests are weighed equally in the event of conflicts (Mansbridge, 1999).

However, representation may connote not just the representation of interests, but also the shared identity of a certain group or category of people. The representative should resemble the socioeconomic background, sex, race, ethnicity, views, or feelings of the represented. There is a pressing need for women's actual presence in power to fulfill this latter sense of representation, also known as "descriptive representation." Democratic decision making, moreover, involves not just the aggregation of interests but also deliberation about common values and policy agendas. In this "deliberative function" of decision making, when interests are uncrystallized, new issues emerge, and the broad outlines of public policy are decided upon (Mansbridge, 1999), it is important to have representatives that share an identity or background with the represented.

Do women in power need a feminist consciousness to represent other women? There is a saying in Latin America that "cuerpo de mujer no significa consciencia de genero" (a woman's body does not imply a gender consciousness). Some feminists complain that many women in power, although they share a nominal gender identity with other women, fail to represent women adequately in the aggregative or deliberative aspects of decision making. As a result, it is not enough to be a woman; one must also have a feminist consciousness. Many Brazilian feminists were thus skeptical of Roseana Sarney's pre-candidacy in the 2002 presidential elections. According to political scientist Lucia Avelar, "we all know that [Roseana] is not a feminist, she is the daughter of the oligarchy.... Roseana's candidacy represents the oligarchical continuity of traditional Brazilian politics in defense of its interests." Feminist writer Rose Marie Muraro commented that "Roseana is co-opting feminist discourse in an abstract way, without concrete proposals.... I don't believe that a person who has sold out can do anything for women, or for men.... [E]verything indicates that [Roseana] and her marketing strategists are using a woman's figure merely as part of a flamboyant electoral strategy" (Femea, January 2002).

Yet there is evidence that even women without connections to the feminist movement or a history of struggle for women's rights bring changes beneficial to democracy. The effects of women's presence may be seen, not necessarily in their views about specific issues, but in the changes women bring to the style of making decisions; in other words, not to substance but to process. One conclusion from a recent study on women in foreign policy, for example, found that women have a distinctive leadership style that improved decision making and negotiations. Interviewees from Latin America, the United States, and at international financial institutions reported that women are better listeners, more grounded, less confrontational, more teamwork oriented, less hierarchical, and more inclusive than men. Some interviewees added that women are more practical, more detail oriented, and more willing to make tough decisions. One senior trade negotiator said in an interview that "a woman approaches something in a way that doesn't need all the chest puffing or the rooster syndrome. Often when you get two male negotiators in the room who haven't met each other or worked with each other, you can visibly watch them puff out their chests and start showing. It is really like one of those Discovery [channel] things on television in the animal world, just watching it." (9) In short, the changes women make to democratic decision making may be subtle. Women's influence may not be visible in explicit political platforms or legislative agendas, but in the fresh perspectives they give to the interstices of political life, to informal conversations in the corridors of congress, to questions raised at committee hearings, and to personal dealings with staff members. Over the longer term, these incremental changes may accumulate and produce larger transformations.

Future Challenges

The challenge for Brazil and other Latin American countries is to turn women's abstract rights into concrete rights. Many of the advances in women's rights over the past decade and a half--domestic violence policies, quotas, legal changes, women's agencies in different levels of government--are more symbolic than substantive. In few cases have resources been allocated and institutions changed to guarantee implementation of new laws and policies. We have already discussed loopholes in the Brazilian quota law. Councils to represent women's rights in state and local governments also suffer from a lack of resources and low institutional status; women's police stations as well are underfunded. Moreover, although governments have adopted policies directed at women, a gender perspective has not been mainstreamed into all areas of state action. What is needed is a consciousness about gender and a commitment to advancing women's rights that penetrates all policy areas. Turning women's abstract rights into concrete rights thus requires deep institutional and political changes. It may be that these come only over the long term. It may also be that having more women in power now will contribute, perhaps in subtle ways, to bringing about these changes. Men may take the first steps toward change, but institutionalizing women's advancements over the long term requires that more women be present in power.

TABLE 1: WOMEN IN POLITICAL POWER IN BRAZIL

                           2002    1990    1980

Ministers                    0%     17%     n/d
Senate                       7%      0%      1%
Chamber of Deputies          6%      5%      1%
Governors *                  7%      0%      0%
State Legislatures          10%      5%      2%
Mayors                       6%      2%      1%
Municipal Councils          12%     n/d     n/d

* After April 2002, there were two women governors of Brazil's
26 states and 1 federal district.

Sources: Inter-American Dialogue (2001b); Htun (forthcoming).

TABLE 2: WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE 1988 BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION

Area                  Rights

Basic Principles      Women and men have equal
                      rights and obligations

Family                Women and men have equal
                      rights and obligations in the family

                      Families are constituted by
                      marriage and stable unions

                      The state is obliged to take
                      measures to prevent intrafamily
                      violence

Health                All couples have the right to
                      decide the number and spacing
                      of their children, and the state is
                      obliged to furnish information on
                      family planning *

Work                  The state is obliged to protect
                      women's position in the labor
                      market

                      120 days of paid maternity leave

                      Sex discrimination in employ-
                      ment and wages is prohibited

Domestic Workers      Minimum wage

                      Weekly day of rest

                      Paid annual vacation

                      Maternity leave

                      Social security

* In addition, organized Brazilian women were able to block an effort
to include a constitutional clause protecting "life at conception."

Source: CFEMEA (1996).

Notes

(1) See the Genderstats site at the World Bank. Available online at <http://genderstats.worldbank.org/SummaryGender.asp? WhichRpt=country&Ctry=BRA,Brazily.>

(2) This discussion borrows from chapter five of Htun (forthcoming, 2003).

(3) For a more detailed discussion of the progress of women's rights legislation in the Brazilian Congress, see the monthly newsletter Femea, published by CFEMEA and available online at <www.cfemea.org.br>.

(4) This discussion borrows from Htun (2001).

(5) In contrast to the conventional wisdom about the undisciplined nature of Brazilian parties, recent studies show that during the Cardoso administration, parties in Congress were quite disciplined. Legislators voted overwhelmingly along party lines, behavior attributable to the president's legislative powers and the centralization of power in congressional leadership (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000). Yet the fact that parties in Congress may, at the time of the vote, behave like disciplined parties does not mean that they cease to be clientelistic, undisciplined parties at other stages of the political process (such as candidate nominations).

(6) Interview with Rio de Janeiro Mayor Cesar Maia, organizer of Sarney's presidential pre-campaign, Rio de Janeiro, June 14, 2002.

(7) Interview with PSDB secretary general Marcio Fortes, Brasilia, June 19, 2002.

(8) Folha de Sao Paulo, July 28, 2002.

(9) This information is from Htun (2002).

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Mala Htun is Assistant Professor in the political science department at New School University and a fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University. She is the author of Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family under Latin American Dictatorships and Democracies, forthcoming in 2003 from Cambridge University Press.

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