The global-local intersection of feminism in Muslim societies: the cases of Iran and Azerbaijan

Social Research, Fall, 2002 by Nayereh Tohidi

For the pragmatic ruling male elite in Iran, the geopolitical stakes are high in the Caspian region. For both internal interethnic and external geopolitical reasons, Azerbaijan holds a special and sensitive place in Iran's foreign policy. In Iran's rivalry with Turkey, Russia, and the Western powers over political and economic influence in the Caspian region and Central Asia, an ideological compromise by the Iranian government with regard to the form of hejab might seem a small concession. Yet it took over seven years, a change of presidents, and then a shift in the orientation of the Majles (parliament) after the February 2000 elections to revive the debate around the question of chador versus mantorusari. Later, this debate resurfaced with greater vigor than before through the more open and reform-oriented print media. It was initiated by three newly elected female parliamentary representatives who are determined to wear a moderate hejab

(manto-rusari) in the Majles. Supported by a few other women representatives, they noted that the majority of Muslim women worldwide and in Iran wear other modes of dress. (16) Some prominent, newly elected male deputies also made public statements in support of the new female deputies arguments.

Until recently, any criticism of the chador, especially by a woman, was taboo. In May 1999, for instance, secularist Turkish deputies barred an elected female deputy, Marveh Kavakchi, from taking her seat in parliament because she was wearing a headscarf. In reaction, about 200 chador-clad Iranian women, led by a conservative female deputy, took to the streets of Tehran to protest against the Turkish deputies "for violating the basic rights of a Muslim woman." Kavakchi, however, voiced her anger against this demonstration, saying, "I do not need the support of those who do not believe in democracy and the right to choose one's style of life and dress code, be it the Iranian Islamists or Turkish secularists." (17) She was proved correct when less than a year later the same Islamist women in Iran threatened to bar elected deputies from parliament because they chose not to wear a chador.

Thus, one of the first impacts of international contacts with Muslim and non-Muslim women outside Iran, especially with neighboring Turkey, post-Soviet Azerbaijan and Central Asia, has been a challenge to the chador; a challenge that has helped open debate, negotiation, and criticism about the hejab. This interplay between the resistances of many Iranian women against the compulsory veiling at national level with the international push against it has resulted in increasingly more flexible dress codes in terms of style and color. Currently a growing number of young women in Iran are seen with stylish clothing and colorful scarves showing of good part of their hair.

Some crossnational influences on Iranian Islamists in Azerbaijan are also noteworthy. One is a trend in support of Islamic hejab--not the chador, but the manto-rusari--among some Azeri women. This trend is in line with a similar style worn in neighboring Turkey, but those Azeri women activists who are pushing for adoption of the headscarf are closely connected to the pro-Iran Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (Tohidi, 2000).