Consciousness Studies: Cross-Cultural Perspectives

Journal of Parapsychology, The, Fall, 2003 by Rex G. Stanford

Discussion of paradoxical awareness in Chapter 3 continues with summaries of work on subliminal awareness in brain-damaged individuals (e.g., in those with blindsight) and on functional suggested blindness during hypnosis. The primary discussion of suggested blindness ends, appropriately, on a cautious note about interpretation of those findings, but that caution does hot seem to adequately constrain later references to this matter, including some made within the same chapter. Discussion turns, finally, to pathological awareness, and there is special focus on dissociation and multiple personality disorder. Rao's discussion of Stephen Braude's treatment of these topics is a very positive feature. I wish that he also had discussed and cited the social-psychological perspective on these matters as reflected particularly in the writings of the late Nicholas Spanos (1994), which include consideration of cross-cultural work. The chapter concludes with an introductory section on the neuropsychology of unconscious function, which includes three different models of the nature of subjective experience that are sufficiently diverse to suggest something of the range of possible approaches to this topic.

Absent, in this and in other chapters of this volume, was meaningful discussion of an important class of models of cognitive function, developed in recent decades, namely connectionist models. These consist, generally, of computer models of neural networks presumed to engage in parallel distributed processing in the brain. These computer models of neural-network function can accomplish some of the known functions of higher human cognition. Although these models as a group are controversial--especially as complete accounts of various aspects of higher cognitive function--they have the particular virtue of using some conceptually simple, parsimonious means to achieve outcomes that recreate several important known features of higher cognitive function (see Martindale, 1991, for an introduction to these topics). Among other matters, these models allow pattern recognition and the generalization of knowledge (Reisberg, 2001; Ch. 3, pp. 80-81; Ch. 8, pp. 262-269). They obviate the need for conscious, controlled, serial processing in the actual execution of certain tasks and allow greatly enhanced processing speed. Rao fully acknowledges that unconscious processing underlies much of cognitive function, but he would, in my view, have done well to have much more fully apprised his readers of the kinds of mechanisms that could help to explain unconscious cognitive function. He instead opts to view the models of modern cognitive psychology as efforts to do an end run around the real problem of consciousness, which he deems to be its subjective element. I would ask, though, whether anyone has done a good job of addressing that problem. Frankly, I doubt that, even after reading this book.

Chapter 4, "Paranormal Awareness," covers: spontaneous cases and a fine synopsis of some of Louisa Rhine's conclusions about such cases; experimental work on ESP; the replicability of ESP studies; remote viewing work; ESP in dreams; a possible relationship between extrasensory and subliminal sensory functioning (see later remarks), sheep-goat research and, more generally, attitudes and ESP; personality variables, largely neuroticism in some sense; physiological correlates and measures of psi influence; memory and extrasensory function; psi missing; the differential effects, of which Rao was the major investigator; extraversion and ESP; ESP during relaxation and during hypnosis; meditation as possibly fostering extrasensory ability; ganzfeld and ESP; and topics potentially related to post-mortem survival, including spontaneous occurrences (both unique and recurrent), mediumistic controls, cross-correspondences, apparitions, out-of-body experiences, near-death experiences, and studies of ostensible reincarnation cases. This chapter concludes with discussion of awareness as such (i.e., so-called pure consciousness) and the commentary of several contemporary philosophers of mind that bear on the meaning of these mystical experiences. Rao puts special emphasis, as seems appropriate, on the transformative potential of such experiences.