Synchronicity, Causality, And Acausality

Journal of Parapsychology, The, Sept, 1999 by Lance Storm

Psi Conditions and Archetypal Contingence as Metacausal Phenomena

Jung recognized that conceptual language has a "causalistic coloring" (1960, para. 965), and to describe archetypes as "underlying" certain "psychophysical equivalences" (para. 964) does suggest causal relations. But, as illustrated in the above example, Jung means an "existing quality," an "irreducible contingency" (para. 965). However, we are left wondering how real is the distinction between cause and contingence. The distinction may only exist discursively. We can test this claim by considering a similar situation in parapsychology, where an apparent distinction exists between psi-causes on one hand, and psi-permissive and psi-conducive conditions on the other.

The parapsychological terms psi-permissive and psi-conducive have arisen as a result of the frequent observation that psi is more likely to occur with certain experimenters, and/or certain subjects. Schmeidler (1997) considers psi a natural ability, which is enhanced by experimenters who create a warm climate, and encourage the subject to cooperate (these are psi-permissive features). Stanford (1977, p. 831) cites seven psi-conducive "features" developed by Braud (1975). These are:

1. "Physical relaxation."

2. "Reduced 'physical' arousal or activation." (There are exceptions to this state, such as the precognitive dream, where arousal levels are actually higher than in the waking state [Stanford, 1977, p. 832].)

3. "Reduction in sensory input and processing."

4. "Increased awareness of internal processes, feelings and images."

5. "Receptive mode/right-hemispheric functioning as opposed to action mode/left-hemispheric functioning."

6. "An altered view of the nature of the world." For example, feeling that it is "possible to know things more directly than we usually consider possible."

7. "Psi (or what might be accomplished through psi) [which] must be (at least) momentarily present."

While the parapsychologist would be satisfied that these features (conditions) are distinct from the actual psi-cause (assuming such a cause exists), one could argue that any, or all of them might indeed be metacauses, such as (7). Stanford (1977, pp. 838-839) explains that this feature means there must be a need for success, where motivation is the driving force behind psi success. In one short step one can go from the motivation of the individual (this constitutes the condition), to an actual causal (or better, metacausal) effect of motivation as a factor in and of the individual. After all, surely psi is more than a condition that is conducive to a psi effect.

Should we not regard psi as a cause, where psi is defined by Thalbourne (1982, p. 56) as meaning both "paranormal process" and "paranormal causation"? The other six features listed previously could equally be considered metacausal. It is important, therefore, to recognize that only an apparent distinction may exist between the psi-cause, and psi-permissive/psi-conducive features as conditions. They may be more intricately enmeshed than the terms suggest.