Synchronicity, Causality, And Acausality

Journal of Parapsychology, The, Sept, 1999 by Lance Storm

But Hines ignores the dreams that are not forgotten, and do not depend on cues, and, in fact, usually hold an overpowering (because relevant) emotional component for the dreamer. The "reality" of the dream and the reality of the event merge and give the dream a quality of "truthfulness" in its own right--it is not simply a coincidence. Furthermore, often it is the case that the dreamer has these dreams at the time of the real life event and not before the event. Either way, the claim of synchronicity is warranted.

SYNCHRONICITY AS A PHILOSOPHICAL CONUNDRUM

The theory of synchronicity has also been subjected to philosophical criticism. Braude (1979, pp. 217-241) vehemently attacks synchronicity from two fronts. First, he reminds us of the "context-dependence of relations of meaningfulness" (p. 228), and second, he considers the postulate and construct of an archetypal substructure that underlies synchronicity must imply a causal relation in these events, not an acausal one based on inconstant connection through contingence, equivalence, or meaning.

Meaning

In the first case, Braude believes that events are "parsed" in a subjective way that can be meaningful or not, according to the interpreter: "Nature ... does not dictate how we individuate events" (p. 219) .Jung, however, did recognize the subjective component of meaning in synchronicity, but Braude conceals this fact by taking a quote out of context from Jung's essay. Jung describes synchronicity as a "factor in nature which expresses itself in the arrangement of events and appears to us as meaning" (1960, para. 916). But Jung adds, "Although meaning is an anthropomorphic interpretation it nevertheless forms the indispensable criterion of synchronicity. What that factor which appears to us as 'meaning' may be in itself we have no possibility of knowing" (para. 916). Again, Braude quotes Jung: "Synchronicity postulates a meaning which is a priori in relation to human consciousness and apparently exists outside man" (para. 942). The idea that meaning could exist "outside man" is not plausible, nor reasonable to Braude. But, in a footnote, Jung adds, "In view of the possibility that synchronicity is not only a psychophysical phenomenon but might also occur without the participation of the human psyche, I should like to point out that in this case we should have to speak not of meaning but of equivalence or conformity" (1960, p. 502, n.71). Braude falls to acknowledge Jung's insight into the subjective nature of meaning. The problem is not, as Braude would have it, to do with Jung's failure to grasp the semantic implications of an entity (meaning), or of categories of relation (subjectivity and objectivity). Jung has indeed attempted to find more suitable, more philosophically acceptable words to describe "instances" or "occasions" (synchronicities) which cannot be explained causally, yet still appear to have connections or relations to the experient beyond mere coincidence. Synchronicity is clearly more than coincidence, but the degree or extent--or more correctly, "quality"--of that "more-ness" seems descriptive only through words, such as "meaning" or "meaningfulness," as it would not be measurable (not being a quantity).