The Psychology of Freedom. - book reviews

Mind, Jan, 1998 by Alfred Mele

All this is debatable, of course. But Pink steers clear of this debate and some related traditional debates about freedom. He steadfastly refuses to take up issues about moral responsibility traditionally associated with freedom (see p. 12), and he honestly reports that "this book will not tell you" whether freedom is compatible with determinism (p. 11). I have no objection to this in principle. However, I think that traditional concerns specifically about the circumscribed species of freedom that Pink addresses--the freedom to act (including decide) otherwise--do require attention. Pink attacks the implausible libertarian view that deciding to do A renders one unfree to do other than A (pp. 81-121). But a libertarian need not be committed to this implausible view in order to hold that, in a deterministic world, no one is free to act (including decide) otherwise than she does. Some libertarians have argued that determinism precludes free action and free will precisely because, in a deterministic world, no one could ever have done otherwise than she did. It is plausible that an agent who could not have done otherwise than A at t was not free to do otherwise than A at t. The construction of an account of "could have done otherwise"---a traditional task in the literature on freedom---certainly seems to be in order, given Pink's aim of illuminating the freedom to do otherwise. Here, I believe, an excursion into the metaphysics of free will is called for as a way of making Pink's account of the freedom to do otherwise more substantial.

Pink's account of decision-making is detailed and instructive. To the extent that he has clarified the nature of decision-making, he has clarified free decision-making: we cannot know what deciding freely is unless we know what deciding is. I suspect, however, that a proper account of free decision-making--and even just of the freedom to decide and act otherwise--will run significantly deeper than a full-blown account of decision-making itself. Pink expresses the hope that his "idea of freedom ... can be made acceptable to Incompatibilists and Compatibilists alike" (p. 79). But even when the idea is taken for what it is explicitly said to be--an idea specifically of the freedom to act otherwise--it is not developed in sufficient detail to be regarded as a gift by either side. That said, Pink's position on decision-making is a real contribution to the literature.

ALFRED MELE
Department of Philosophy
Davidson College
Davidson, NC 28036

USA