Lebanon's conundrum - peace situation in Lebanon

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Wntr, 1999 by Augustus Richard Norton

In fact, if Israel withdraws from the south, it will be a relatively simple matter for the Lebanese army to disarm Hizballah, because its raison d'etre is not limited to bullets and bombs. Conversely, without an Israeli withdrawal, Hizballah has broad support for refusing to put down its weapons. As for Hizballah's external friends Iran and Syria, they have no incentive to end the resistance. For Iran, Israel is anathema, and for Syria, Hizballah's pressure on Israel serves an instrumental purpose; namely, it raises Syria's value as a negotiating partner and increases the likelihood that Syrian suzerainty in Lebanon will be formally recognized to the disadvantage of the Lebanese.

In July 1996, responding to pressure from the Israeli military, which has begun to question the tenability of the Israeli position in Lebanon, especially after the heavy criticism that followed the Qana massacre, and in a patent attempt to send a message to Syria, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu released a new trial balloon to test the idea of a "Lebanon first" option. Rather than considering the question of the South as an adjunct to broader negotiations with Syria, Netanyahu proposed the idea of an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in return for appropriate security arrangements, including the disarming of Hizballah. From Israel's perspective, the idea has a lot to recommend it. First, and perhaps primarily, it might relieve the pressure on Israel from the United States to make concessions in other realms of the peace process, namely, in the remaining occupied areas of the West Bank. Equally enticing, by leaving southern Lebanon, Israel would be eliminating Syria's trump card. Predictably, Syria rejected the proposal, arguing that Damascus holds the key to peace in South Lebanon. The Lebanese obediently followed suit, citing the proposal as a ploy intended to weaken Syria and therefore Lebanon. At the end of the day, the trial balloon may have been good public relations, but it only served to underline that Israeli-Syrian negotiations are the only game in town.

CONCLUSION

Lebanon continues to be captive to the peace process. Lebanon's senior politicians have shown no enthusiasm for staking out an independent path and have resigned themselves to following the Syrian lead. Israel has been perfectly content to accept Syria as it main interlocutor for Lebanese matters, and the United States, while maintaining diplomatic representation in Beirut, has also presumed that the Lebanese are not masters of their own fate. Threatening troop movements by the Israeli, Lebanese, and Syrian armies in October 1996 served to highlight the stakes in the peace process for all concerned parties, although the maneuvers were clearly moves on the diplomatic chessboard as the players repositioned themselves for the next stage in negotiations.

The subordination of Lebanese politics to Syrian interests is for now a fact. Lebanon's independence is a hostage to the peace process. Whether the hostage will be released at the end of the process remains a central question.