Lebanon's conundrum - peace situation in Lebanon

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Wntr, 1999 by Augustus Richard Norton

The result was a resounding if tainted government victory. In Beirut, where Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri headed his own list, the list captured 14 of 19 seats and only two opposition candidates won seats. The results in Beirut were indicative of the pattern throughout the country. Oppositionists did manage to capture a few seats, but the lion's share of the 128 seats are firmly in the government's and Syria's corner. This means that the Beirut government will continue to acquiesce obediently to Syria's ultimate control over Lebanon.

As noted above, one of the most dramatic aspects of the 1992 elections was the entry of Hizballah, the Party of God, into Lebanese parliamentary politics. Of 27 seats assigned to Shiite Muslims, Hizballah won 8 in 1992, but there was no doubt that the Hizballah candidates were assisted by the Christian boycott. Were they not boycotting, many Christian voters could have been expected to cast a vote against Hizballah.

Contrary to the anxious concerns of some Lebanese, and particularly some western officials, Hizballah performed responsibly in parliament. In fact, the party's deputies proved to be just as pragmatic as their secular colleagues, and often brokered deals and built legislative alliances in order to promote desirable legislation. In this sense, and as a number of leading Lebanese politicians have emphasized in private interviews conducted in 1995 and 1996, the entry of Hizballah into parliament is a success story, yet another proof that participation in the political game tends to moderate radical players. Muhammad Ra'd, president of Hizballah's Political Council, told the author in 1996 that, despite its earlier rejection of any participation in Lebanese political institutions, the party had come to the conclusion that the Ta'if Accord changed the structure of the system so that constructive participation was now possible.

Nonetheless, despite its strong base of popular support, Hizballah faced strong competition in the 1996 elections. Hizballah's campaign stressed its role in resisting Israel's occupation of Lebanon's soil. Thus one ubiquitous poster in West Beirut, which referred to the leading role played by Hizballah fighters in the resistance, said: "They resist with their blood, resist with your vote." Thanks to its record of clean, non-corrupt politics, Hizballah has a broad base of support among the Shiite Muslims, particularly in the southern suburbs of Beirut (called the dahiya), but even if its candidates can count on a heavy vote from fellow Shiites, the mixed list system often gives the final word to non-Shiite voters who have the option of choosing other Shiite candidates. Hence in the Ba'abda caza the popular Hizballah deputy 'Ali 'Ammar was defeated by a combination of Maronite and Druze enmity and some strong armed manipulation by the Maronite leader of an opposing list.

In addition, Hariri and his colleagues in Syria seem to have been intent to ensure that Hizballah would not expand its role in the political system. In this sense, there may have been a meeting of the minds of the Lebanese government, the Syrians, and U. S. officials. Only seven of the twenty-seven Shiite deputies elected were from Hizballah. Success in the Lebanese electoral system requires candidates to seek alliances, given the need for electoral support across confessional lines. Hizballah candidates did not fare well in areas where the Shiite Muslims comprise a minority. Non-Shiite voters preferred to vote for more moderate candidates. Moreover, Nabih Berri, the speaker of parliament and head of the rival Areal movement, is in a position to dispense vast patronage, and he is supported by Syria to boot. Including his own seat, eleven of the successful Shiite candidates were allies of Nabih Berri. Two were allies of al-Hariri, one was an ally of al-Hoss, two had a base in a leading party, and four were from traditionally powerful families.