Lebanon's conundrum - peace situation in Lebanon

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Wntr, 1999 by Augustus Richard Norton

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Since 1991 Syria has enveloped Lebanon politically and diplomatically. A web of agreements and pacts now link the two countries and serve to legitimate Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs. These range from a Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination and a Pact on Defense and Security, signed in 1991, to bilateral agreements on agriculture, social and economic affairs, health, and the movement of individuals and goods, signed in 1993. The common denominator is that each agreement has served to bring Lebanon closer to the embrace of Syria.

Lebanon, like Syria, attended the Madrid peace conference in 1991, and, with the exception of a brief period in 1993, Beirut has basically followed the lead of Damascus in negotiations with Israel. Syria has, for instance, refused to participate in the multilateral negotiations launched under U.S. and Russian sponsorship in Moscow in January 1992. Hafez al-Asad has argued that the multilateral talks, which deal with the environment, economic development, security, water, and the issue of refugees, serve to lend legitimacy to Israel, conferring the prizes of peace before Israel has earned them by withdrawing from occupied Arab territory. Lebanon has followed the Syrian lead scrupulously, despite the fact the one of the most pressing issues confronting Lebanon in the peace process is the fate of the approximately 350,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. Arguably, it would serve Lebanon's interests to participate in the multilateral talks at least on the refugee question, especially since the government has emphatically declared that it opposes "normalizing" the refugees and integrating them into Lebanese society.

Early in his tenure as prime minister, in February 1993, Rafiq al-Hariri outlined the parameters for negotiations with Israel. Lebanon was willing, he declared, to sign any agreement with Israel, short of a peace treaty, based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 425, the 1978 resolution that calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. He rejected any linkage with Resolutions 242 and 338, which deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the principle of land for peace, since the occupation of southern Lebanon by Israel is unequivocally rejected in Resolution 425, and in Resolution 425, unlike Resolutions 242 and 338, there is no suggestion of a principle of territorial adjustment. Finally, he declared his refusal to wait for progress by other parties negotiating with Israel. Hariri's independent position did not survive the spring, and by October 1993 Lebanon announced a policy of "total coordination" with Syria.

Diplomatically, Lebanon has been relatively isolated since 1993, when it became clear that Beirut had tied its fate to Syria in the peace process. In Washington it became increasingly common for officials to presume that Lebanon's "zip code" was the same as Syria's. The United States has continued to emphasize its continuing commitment to the territorial integrity of the country, to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese soil, and to the reestablishment of peace and security. Nonetheless, U.S. Middle East policy under President Bill Clinton has been remarkably partial to Israeli perspectives, and especially so in southern Lebanon, where Washington has often offered unconditional support for Israel's actions. This penchant was clearly demonstrated in April 1996, during Israel's "Grapes of Wrath" operation (discussed below). Despite the fact that Israel's continuing presence in the south is in clear violation of Resolution 425, which the United States sponsored, President Bill Clinton accepted Israel's assertions that it was acting only to protect its own security and took no action except to emphasize its support for Israel.