Lebanon's conundrum - peace situation in Lebanon

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Wntr, 1999 by Augustus Richard Norton

Over the course of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon there have been relatively few civilians killed in Israel as a result of fire from Lebanon. Since 1982 twelve Israeli civilians have been killed as a result of attacks launched from the South, and since 1993 only three have died. These deaths are regrettable, but they are modest in number by comparison with the toll in Lebanese civilians, for whom the price of Israeli security has been high. The combined Lebanese civilian deaths incurred during the 1993 and 1996 invasions total nearly 300, including the 103 or 104 people massacred in the Israeli shelling of the UNIFIL base in Qana in April 1996. In the period between Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath, 45 Lebanese civilians were killed by the Israelis or their allies, compared to three Israeli civilians.

The report of the UN Secretary General's military advisor demonstrates that it is likely Israel fired on the UNIFIL site in Qana intentionally and with disregard for the lives of civilians housed there, as well as the safety of UNIFIL soldiers.(7) The report shows that the thirteen shells that fell on the compound were decisively not accidental overshots, but exploded where they had been aimed. This tragic incident illustrates the disdain for innocent lives that often characterizes the actions of the IDF in Israel.

The logic of Israel's "iron fist" is to punish Lebanese civilians disproportionately for the IDF's inability to prevent attacks on its own soldiers as well for the retaliatory firing of katyusha rockets at Israel. Israeli strategists consistently assume that by imposing an awesome burden on the Lebanese - as when 400,000 people were roused from their homes and given a few hours to flee on threat of bombardment in April 1996 - support for the resistance will wither. This is a clear strategic miscalculation reflecting an inability to understand that the attacks on the Security Zone are widely popular because many Lebanese believe that a reduction in pressure will induce Israel not to leave but to stay.

Washington and Tel Aviv call regularly for the disarming of Hizballah, and Israel has made the de-fanging of Hizballah a precondition for withdrawal, as though it were merely a collection of fanatically-crazed gunmen directed by Iran and manipulated by Syria. In effect, Israel and its friends in Washington often assume that Hizballah is a mirror image of the SLA, namely, an easily manipulated and completely dependent proxy force. This is a faulty image. Hizballah's role in the resistance has won it support, especially among the ShiRes of the Beirut suburbs, whose roots are usually in the south, and Hizballah looks more and more like an efficient political party.

Although Hizballah refuses to engage in any direct negotiations with Israel, which it routinely excoriates in brutal language, it has negotiated indirectly with Israel. It did so most recently in July 1996, when, through German mediators, Israel and Hizballah agreed to the exchange of the remains of their fallen fighters. A small step, obviously, but the corpse talks may have opened a useful channel for further dialogue. Hizballah has maintained a position of calculated ambiguity in terms of what it will do should Israel actually withdraw from the south. While it is widely believed in Lebanon that the violence against Israel would then stop, Hizballah has avoided saying this directly. In this sense, its calculated ambiguity makes it far easier for Israel to justify staying than leaving.