The geopolitics of post-Soviet Russia and the Middle East

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Wntr, 2002 by Andrej Kreutz

A second reason and one of growing importance is an economic one. In the 1970s and 1980s, the USSR was undoubtedly a major arms supplier to the Arab states of the region, as late as 1988 the USSR supplied the Middle East with arms worth over $14.5 billion, as compared to 12.2 billion delivered by the U.S. (40) However, its motivation was mainly political and ideological and the commercial value of that trade was questionable. Post Communist Russia is looking instead for profit and for that purpose, and not only for security reasons, Russia wants to preserve as much as possible her control over the Caspian Sea oil and its transportation to the West. (41) In that area, just as in the Middle East as a whole, "although the Cold War has ended, geopolitical competition has not," (42) and as already mentioned, Russia has to face the growing impact of the U.S. which now has concrete interests in the development in the region of the natural gas and petroleum industries. (43)

Some Russian politicians want to look for cooperation with the Arab oil producing countries which are geographically close to the area and which have already acquired considerably experience in dealing with similar economic and political problems. (44) Post Communist Russia also needs to find customers for Russian industry among those countries that are relatively rich but still poorly developed. Efforts in this direction are presently seen as being more urgent since previous hopes for integration into the Western-developed economy are generally now considered to have been unsuccessful, and most Russian commentators are calling for a search for alternative clients and economic partners." (45) Particularly important here are links with Iran, but for similar reasons Moscow seeks expanded dialogue with Kuwait and the other Gulf States. The potential hefty commercial gains are also an important reason to support and protect Iraq.

The third reason for Russia's Middle East involvement is cultural and religious, which, in Russia's case are much stronger than for other parts of Europe. (46) Those links might be seen as a reflection of the fact that Russia, at least in its cultural traditions, is predominately Eastern Orthodox, but it is also a Muslim country while its Jewish community has been one of the most numerous, and in cultural terms, most active in the world. At present about 15% of the Russian population (about 20 million people) have a Muslim cultural background. (47) Although after the long period of Communist persecution, relatively few of them sill practice their inherited religious traditions, they are nevertheless differentiated from the rest of the society by their special social cultural and sometimes also by their political attitudes. (48) Despite the increase in anti-Muslim feelings since the war in Chechenya and the waves of terrorist attacks in Moscow and other cities, Russian Muslims have managed to establish themsel ves as a relatively influential, although mainly parochial and self-centered pressure group. (49)