Marginalized Violent Internal Conflict In The Age Of Globalization: Mexico And Egypt

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Summer, 1999 by Dan Tschirgi

Conai became the principle agent in a year-long mediation and negotiation process, during which the Zapatistas cultivated a strong presence in civil society and made extensive use of communications media to seek worldwide support. However, negotiations between Zapatistas and the government broke down in 1996 amid mutual accusations of bad faith - although mediation efforts continued. The ensuing years witnessed a deterioration of the mediation process as well as rising violence in Chiapas. Much of the latter was perpetrated by local anti-Zapatista paramilitary forces who appear to have acted with the knowledge and encouragement of state and national authorities, if not at their direction.

Against this dark background, Bishop Ruiz dissolved Conai and abandoned his mediating role in the early summer of 1998. Cocopa pledged to continue working for a peaceful settlement but reliable sources portrayed that body as dispirited and suffering from internal dissention and a lack of coordination.(8) By the spring of 1999, no improvement was visible and the danger of renewed hostilities remained uncomfortably high.

In contrast to the Zapatistas' struggle, that of Egypt's Gama'a al-Islamiyya has not been tempered by negotiations of any sort. The bloodletting initiated by the Gama'a has been more prolonged and has exacted a higher cost on the nation than has its counterpart in Mexico. Formed in the early 1970s, the Gama'a was inspired by the early militancy of the Muslim Brotherhood - an organization founded in the 1920s which has since renounced violence (although it is currently banned in Egypt) in favor of working politically for an Islamic state under Shari'a. Proclaiming these same goals, the Gama'a holds that Egypt's current political system and its leaders are religiously, morally and politically corrupt and have violated true Islamic and Egyptian values.

In the early 1990s, the Gama'a embarked on a sustained campaign of violence that made it the most prominent of Egypt's militant Islamic groups. Working through networks established over the years in poor neighborhoods of Cairo and other cities, the Gama'a was able to project its straggle, largely by terrorism, throughout much of the country. However, its focal point was Upper Egypt.

The Egyptian government adopted and maintained a hard-line approach to the Gama 'a al-Islamiyya, rejecting any possibility of negotiations. Instead, it relied on heavy security measures, including massive arrests, the death penalty, and - after October, 1992 - the use of military courts to try suspected militants. A sustained corollary to the government's forceful response has been the use of the state-sanctioned "official" religious establishment as well as the mass media to undermine the Gama'a's claim to Islamic purity.(9)

By 1996, Egypt's government had clearly gained the upper hand. Militant attacks were in decline, though not ended, and this was paralleled by a resurgence of international tourism. Despite sporadic clashes in Upper Egypt, some Gama'a leaders suggested a cease-fire in the spring 1996, a call that was repeated a year later when six major Gama 'a figures (and the group's spiritual advisor) proclaimed a "halt [to] military operations. . . ."(10) These initiatives, which were rejected by the government, seemed to reveal a growing division in Gama'a ranks. This was confirmed in November 1997 when members of the organization slaughtered fifty-eight foreign tourists in Luxor.