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Globalization: Trade And Investment In Egypt, Jordan And Syria Since 1980 - Statistical Data Included
Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Summer, 1999 by Paul Sullivan
More recently remittances have averaged about $3-4 billion. Egypt's remittances seemed to have defied the fall in the oil price in the 1980s.(22) That may have been due more to economic diplomacy by the Gulf states than the necessary increasing demand for Egyptian labor by the GCC and other Arab oil producers. These increases against the trend in oil prices and oil revenues may have been a signal from the Arab oil states that they were going to support Egypt even in the face of the Arab embargo of Egypt and Egypt's signing of the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty with Israel. They may not have been that much against the treaty in the first place, possibly. The increased remittances may have been a subtle way to replace the aid that would have come from the Arab oil states had the peace treaty with Israel not been signed. However, the Arab oil states could not say this openly and publicly. They could say it by hiring more Egyptians even though publicly they disagreed with Egyptian foreign policy. This is the opposite of what they did to the Palestinians, Yemenis, Sudanese, and Jordanians after the Gulf war because of their countries' foreign policies with regard to Iraq.(23)
Like Egypt and Syria, Jordan's remittance trade really started to take off after the 1973 oil shock. There was another sharp upturn after the 1979 oil shock. Jordanian remittances boomed from $21 million in 1972 to close to $1 billion in 1981-82. By 1991 they were $450 million. However, there was already a significant and steady decline in remittances to Jordan before the Gulf war happened.(24) The decline before and during the Gulf war was mostly due to the expulsion of Jordanians, especially Palestinians, almost entirely from Kuwait, and many from Saudi Arabia. Many also left before and during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and during the time period between the end of that war and the multinational coalition invasion of Iraq. These drops in remittances, however, were mitigated by the remittance deposits into Jordan brought back by some of the "lucky" returnees. By 1993 remittances were back up to $1 billion. By 1996 they were $6 billion. These recent increases may be due to the return of some of the expelled Jordanians to the Gulf, although not many to Kuwait, and to the settlements of legal cases brought by Jordanians for lost assets because of the war and the expulsions.(25)
What are other indications of global trade connections for the three countries, connections that could help them develop globalization strategies and successes in the future?
Total trade (imports and exports of goods and services) was 100% of GDP for Jordan in 1973. By 1980 it was 225% of GDP. Jordan saw a huge drop in trade/GDP from 1980-1986. By 1986 the ratio was back down to 100%. But it has bounced back. Over the last couple of years it has been at about 140-150% of GDP.(26)
For Egypt, total trade had been between 50 and 80% of GDP form 1975 to 1997. There was a secular decline from 1980 to 1987 from about 80% to 50%. Since then it has bounced back to around 60-70% of GDP.(27)