Dynastic Modernism And Its Contradictions: Testing The Limits Of Pluralism, Tribalism, And King Hussein's Example In Hashemite Jordan

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Summer, 2000 by Andrew Shryock

INTRODUCTION

THIS ARTICLE WAS NOT MEANT to be read (nor was it originally written) as a postmortem, but circumstances have forced it into that mold. The practice of "monarchic pluralism" I describe below has been inherited, along with the throne, by Abdullah II. For now, it is the bedrock of Hashemite political culture. How long it can endure without King Hussein's steadying presence, no one can say.

THE ODD MULTIPLICITY OF THE MODERN DYNAST: KING HUSSEIN'S IMAGE(S) IN CONFLICT AND CONTROL

In the modem nation-state, where popular sovereignty, democracy, and human equality are dominant ideals, it is widely assumed that kings and queens can survive only if their public identity is rooted in flagrant, politically nullifying contradictions. To remain viable as national leaders (or even as national symbols), the monarchs of Scandinavia, Spain, the Benelux countries, and Britain reign by virtue of public anachronism, insisting that they are adaptive and relevant and politically indispensable, all the while acknowledging that their vestigial authority depends on antiquated models of royal blood and divine right that, in today's Europe, are virtually devoid of geopolitical significance.

In the Middle East, where kings are still rulers as well as symbols, the situation is reversed. In Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, or Oman, the nation-state evolves in a political environment shaped by the dynast, his family, and their effective concentration of power. [1] Antique models of royal blood and genealogical authenticity have tremendous geopolitical significance in the Arab Gulf states, where the U.S. spends billions of dollars a year propping up and occasionally reinstalling governments controlled by royal lineages. Although they are fiscally embedded in the growth sectors of the global economy and possess state-of-the-art technological, military, and educational infrastructures, there is something not quite modem about the Arab dynastic regimes and their rulers. In the international press they are repeatedly described as "feudal," "archaic," and "traditional." This impression. I would argue, is what made Hussein of Jordan the anomalous figure he was in the West. A proud dynast and descendant of th e Prophet Muhammad, he managed to appear politically modem to Western diplomats and journalists, and this image was in no way tarnished by the fact that Jordan, by almost any socioeconomic measure, is less developed than the realms of the "kings and princes" (al-umara' wa al-muluk) of the Gulf. In fact, Hussein seemed more attuned to metropolitan political culture than most of the Arab world's presidents and prime ministers, who espouse textbook blends of nationalism, socialism, and other resolutely modem ideologies. [2]

Like the monarchs of Europe, Hussein juxtaposed images of tradition and modernity in artful ways. Yet because he ruled Jordan and did not merely preside over it, Hussein's ability to fashion multiple Hashemite identities, or "royal personae," was a crucial feature of his elaborate apparatus of power. To his subjects, he was a man of many guises: liberal democratizer, monarch, descendant of the Prophet, secularist, shaykh of all tribal shaykhs, and a refuge for the Palestinian people. Hussein's manifestations were crafted in relation to constituencies (and political trends) he sought to influence or control. Many of these forces transcend the borders of the Hashemite Kingdom (for instance, the Islamic trend, liberal refonn movements, the Palestinians as a national community, and the "peace process" in Israel and other U.S.-backed policies in the Middle East). Others are rooted in the tense relationship between Jordan's majority Palestinian population, its indigenous tribes, and other ethnic, regional, and rel igious interests. Hussein's s constituencies, and his personal identifications with them, were often in conflict. He engaged actively in these contests, sometimes as referee, sometimes as ally or opponent. In doing so, Hussein created public models of how these groups should represent and comport themselves in relation to each other.

Hussein's subjects used his "royal example" to construct a range of (conflicting) political cultures and decide who could legitimately speak for and lead them. In this essay, I give closest attention to the constituency called, in the Jordanian press, the "traditionalists": tribal and clan leaders. Hussein's image as dynast, patriarch, and descendant of the Prophet was used to cultivate traditionalist political culture, confine it to certain quarters, and fix its leadership. Yet this strategy was never entirely successful. Tribespeople fashion their own, variably heterodox models of political ideas and identities endorsed by the king. I will explore recent attempts to "mix" tribalism with other political trends: namely, (etlmo)nationalism and pluralist coalition politics. These blends pose a challenge to the Hashemites, who have managed to construct a modernist image that plays well in the metropole, all the while accentuating patriarchal themes at home, thereby insuring that political modernity -- especiall y in the antimonarchic form of "popular sovereignty" -- is kept safely in check. Political trends now popular among Jordan's tribes, the crown's most conservative and loyal subjects, show rather clearly how the Hashemites are handling the contradictions built into their peculiar version of modern dynasticism.