Sectarian Attitudes As A Function Of The Palestinian Presence In Lebanon

Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Summer, 2000 by Simon Haddad

BACKGROUND

THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CRISIS accelerated on 18 April 1948 when several thousand Palestinians fled their homes and poured into neighboring Arab countries. As Israeli historian Benny Morris noted, along with the establishment of the state of Israel, the refugee problem was the major political consequence of the 1948 war, and became one of the intractable components of the Arab-Israeli conflict. [1]

In the early years after the creation of the state of Israel, many Palestinians hoped that the international community would come to their rescue and restore their national and natural rights. However, the most they were offered were a variety of resettlement schemes, which were fiercely rejected, preferring to remain refugees than to give up all claims to their land. [2] The most important piece of international legislation on Palestinian refugees is undoubtedly UN resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the essence of which is to guarantee Palestinian right to return home and to demand compensation. [3] However, since this resolution could not be implemented, UN focus shifted to the humanitarian dimension in an attempt to improve the conditions of Palestinian refugees in the host countries. For this purpose, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was created to assist Palestinian Refugees in the fields of education, work, healthcare and relief.

By the mid-1960s, it was evident that the UN plan had little chance of success as it attempted to solve a political problem using an economic approach. The Arab states were not prepared to cooperate on the large-scale development projects originally foreseen by the Agency as a means of alleviating the Palestinians' situation. In 1949, at the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne, Israel offered to repatriate 100,000 Arab refugees within the framework of a general settlement. The Arab delegations rejected the offer. In 1952, the UN Refugee Rehabilitation Fund offered the Arab states 200 million USD to find homes and jobs for the refugees. The Arab states used some of the money for relief work, but did not even apply for the greatest part of the fund. The Arab governments were unwilling to contribute to any plan that could be interpreted as encouraging resettlement. [4] They preferred to hang on to their own interpretation of Resolution 194, which they believed would eventually lead to repatriation. The Palestinians' only other hope was that the Arab states would resolve the problem, whether by force or diplomacy.

In the prevailing climate of Arab nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, many Palestinians still believed in the Arab nationalist ideal and saw the restoration of their homeland taking place within the broader framework of the unification of the Arab world, chiefly under the leadership of Egypt's President Nasser. The latter had pledged to sweep all traces of Zionism, imperialism and the forces of reaction in the Arab world: [5]

The refugees will not return while the flag of Israel flies over the soil of Palestine. They will return when the flag of Palestine is hoisted over Arab Palestine. (Radio Cairo, 19 July 1957). [5]

The official Israeli position on the other hand, has always been that there can be no returning of the refugees to Israeli territories, and that the only solution to the problem was their resettlement in the Arab states or elsewhere. [6]

The 1967 military defeat of the front line Arab regimes had, among others, two major implications for the Palestinians: first, approximately 360,000 Palestinians were forced to leave the West Bank and Gaza Strip for Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. Second, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) took advantage of the outcome of the war to assert an increasing political and military role.

In September 1970, the Jordanian government launched an attack known as Black September against refugee camps in response to Palestinian military activities in Jordan. The result was the relocation of the PLO power base to Lebanon.

The Palestinians' strong political and military presence in Lebanon during the 1970s, often referred to as a "state-within-a-state", came at the expense of large segments of the Lebanese population. While the Israeli military campaign succeeded in crushing the PLO in Lebanon, it failed to eliminate the Palestinian presence.

The eruption of the Palestinian Intifada in 1987 shifted international attention to the occupied territories and confirmed PLO commitment to a negotiated two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The breakout of the Gulf War increased pressure on the PLO whose support for Iraq alienated Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States. This justified Kuwaiti reprisal against Palestinians with the Palestinian community in Kuwait shrinking from 400,000 in 1990 to some 100,000 in August l991. [7]

The decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, eliminating one of the major supporters of the PLO, further aggravated the situation. Thus, the Palestinians were forced to enter negotiations with Israel culminating with the Oslo Declaration of principles. While Palestinians welcomed the attainment of self-rule and the prospect of a state, the refugees in Lebanon had little reason for rejoicing. In fact, the accords did not mention the 1948 refugees, who constituted the majority of Palestinians in Lebanon directly. The question of the refugees was addressed in two ways; the first through a multilateral working group under Canadian supervision. The second approach to the issue was to include it as an item on the agenda of the "final status" negotiations.